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Abstract
We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of max-
imizing consumer surplus. In many such platforms prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers,
but the platform may influence prices through its promotion policy (e.g., increasing demand to a
certain product by assigning to it a prominent position on the webpage), and the information it
reveals about the additional demand associated with being promoted. Identifying effective joint
information design and promotion policies for the platform is a challenging dynamic problem as
sellers can sequentially learn the promotion “value” from sales observations and update prices
accordingly. We introduce the notion of confounding promotion polices, which are designed to
prevent a Bayesian seller from learning the promotion value (at the cost of diverting consumers
away from the best product offering). Leveraging this notion, we characterize the maximum long-
run average consumer surplus that is achievable by the platform when the seller is myopic. We
then establish that long-run average optimality can be maintained by optimizing over a class of
joint information design and promotion policies under which the platform provides the seller with
a (random) information signal at the beginning of the horizon, and then uses the best confounding
promotion policy, which prevents the seller from further learning. Additionally, we show that
myopic pricing is a best response to such a platform strategy, thereby establishing an approximate
Bayesian Nash equilibrium between the platform and the seller. Our analysis allows one to iden-
tify practical long-run average optimal platform policies in a broad range of demand models and
evaluate the impact of the search environment and the design of promotions on consumer surplus.
Keywords: Information design, Bayesian learning, revenue management, pricing, platforms, on-
line marketplaces
1 Introduction
Online marketplaces and platforms allow consumers to evaluate, compare, and purchase products
while simultaneously providing a channel for third-party sellers to reach a broader consumer base and
increase the demand for their products. As platforms seek to maintain a large consumer base, it
is common for a platform to try to increase consumer surplus by offering high-quality products and
competitive prices. On the other hand, in order to also attract sellers, it is common for platforms to
let sellers determine their own price. Since sellers are typically revenue-maximizers, allowing them to
∗Correspondence: ygur@stanford.edu, gmacnama@stanford.edu, dsaban@stanford.edu.
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set prices may come at the cost of reducing the consumer welfare generated by the platform. However,
platforms still retain the ability to impact consumer surplus by indirectly influencing sellers’ pricing
policies. One important lever for doing so is designing the search and recommendation environment
to incentivize sellers to post low prices. For example, a platform can choose to prominently feature
sellers that set lower prices. In doing so, the platform not only reduces consumers’ search costs, but
it also rewards sellers who set low prices by increasing their visibility and boosting the demand they
face.
A second lever to influence prices posted by sellers is the strategic sharing of demand information.
Platforms typically have the ability to observe and track consumer behavior across products on their
site and thus often have better information about consumer demand than sellers. In particular, the
additional demand that is associated with being promoted by the platform (e.g., being featured in
a prominent position on the webpage) is typically a priori unknown to sellers, and by strategically
sharing this demand information the platform can influence posted prices.
For a concrete example of a promotion offered in a platform, consider Amazon’s featured offer (also
known as the ‘Buy Box’), which is depicted in Figure 1. When a consumer reaches a product page on
Amazon, one particular seller is prominently featured and has a significant advantage over the other
sellers. The consumer has the option to ‘Buy Now’ or ‘Add to Cart’ through links that are positioned
in a designated, highly visible area of the webpage referred to as the ‘Buy Box’, or to consider ‘Other
Sellers on Amazon,’ an option that is positioned in a less visible area of the webpage and typically
requires the consumer to scroll down the page.1
Figure 1: Example of Amazon featured offer (Buy Box)
If the consumer selects ‘Buy Now’ or ‘Add to Cart,’ then the demand will be assigned to the seller
that is featured in the Buy Box. In this case Amazon effectively selects the seller from which the
consumer is purchasing; this valuable advantage allows the promoted seller to capitalize on demand
1A very similar ‘Buy Box’ promotion mechanism is also used by Walmart Marketplace (SellerActive 2017) and eBay
Product-Based Shopping Experience (EcommerceBytes 2017).
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from consumers that are “impatient,” or have a high cost of search. The rest of the sellers, which
were not featured, are grouped under ‘Other Sellers on Amazon,’ and will only be viewed by “patient”
consumers that scroll further down the page. Thus, the seller that is featured in the Buy Box faces
limited competition for consumers who do not search through other sellers and can expect to observe
increased demand and a higher fraction of sales.
The impact of promotion on sales, which may substantially vary across different products and markets,
has direct implications on the incentives of sellers and the pricing policies they deploy. On the one hand,
if most of the consumers tend to buy from the seller that is featured in the Buy Box without considering
other sellers, then being promoted is directly associated with a significant increase in demand and sales.
On the other hand, if the majority of consumers patiently scroll down and consider all the candidate
sellers, then the value of being promoted might be limited and even marginal. Typically, the platform
can track such consumer behavior and identify the additional demand that is associated with being
promoted in a given market. While it is known that being a featured merchant is valuable, individual
sellers do not have access to consumer browsing information that would allow them to identify a
priori the additional demand associated with the platform’s promotion decision.2 Thus, Amazon can
influence pricing decisions not only through its Buy Box promotion policy, but also by leveraging
the underlying information asymmetry through strategically disclosing information on the additional
demand associated with being promoted.
A key challenge a platform faces in utilizing its private information is that sellers can, potentially,
learn the value of promotions over time from sales observations, and update their prices accordingly.
Therefore, the platform needs to strike a balance between providing incentives for prices that maximize
consumer surplus in the current period, and controlling the information that is revealed from sales
observations, which impacts the consumer surplus in subsequent periods. As the platform’s information
disclosure policy impacts the optimal promotion policy, which in turn impacts the seller’s ability to
collect information over time, the platform must consider its promotion and information design policies
jointly. Addressing any of these problems separately can potentially lead to suboptimal system design.
In this paper, we study how a platform can maximize consumer surplus through joint information
design and dynamic promotion policies that balance the aforementioned tradeoff.
We note that while the ‘Buy Box’ example above describes a retail setting, our formulation and
approach are relevant to similar promotions that are common in platforms and online marketplaces
where prices are set by sellers. Examples include lodging platforms (e.g., Airbnb), booking and travel
fare platforms (e.g., Expedia, Booking.com, TripAdvisor), freelancing platforms (e.g., Upwork), and
ordering and delivery platforms (e.g., Uber Eats, Grubhub). While the structure of promotions and
2Amazon’s promotion decisions are based on a Featured Merchant Algorithm (FMA). While Amazon does not publicly
reveal the factors accounted for by the FMA when selecting the featured seller, there are many resources suggesting that
the featured sellers are those who set low prices, have high consumer ratings, etc. See, e.g., the blog post by Informed.co
(2018) for a description of Amazon Featured Merchant Status and some details on the FMA algorithm, as well as Chen
et al. (2016) for an overview and analysis of factors that impact Amazon’s promotion decision.
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the criteria the platform uses for selecting the promoted sellers may vary across these settings, they
all share common features: promotions are valuable to sellers, the additional demand associated with
being promoted might be a priori unknown to sellers, and the platform may consider various ways of
sharing information about this value with sellers.
1.1 Main Contributions
Our contributions lie in (1) introducing a stylized model for studying the interaction between a platform
and a seller who does not know the value of promotions (has incomplete demand information), in
a broad family of demand structures; (2) characterizing the maximum long-run average expected
consumer surplus that is achievable by the platform when the seller is myopic; (3) characterizing
practical platform policies that achieve this consumer surplus in equilibrium, and (4) providing a
prescription for identifying such platform policies given a concrete demand model, which allows one
to study how demand primitives impact efficient information design and promotion policies. More
specifically, our contribution is along the following dimensions.
(1) Modeling. Our model considers a platform that can promote a single product to each arriving
consumer, and a seller that sequentially sets prices and has access to sales observations. Our for-
mulation considers a broad class of demand and consumer choice structures, and assumes that each
arriving consumer is either impatient, and therefore considers only the promoted product (versus an
outside option of not buying at all), or patient, and therefore considers all the available alternatives.
As impatient consumers only have the promoted product in their consideration set, the fraction of
these consumers captures the value of promotion to the seller.
The platform has private information about the true fraction of impatient consumers. At the beginning
of the horizon, the platform provides an initial information signal regarding this fraction, and commits
to a dynamic promotion policy (a dynamic sequence of functions that at each period maps the true
fraction of impatient consumers, the seller’s belief regarding this fraction, and the price posted by the
seller, to a (possibly random) promotion decision. Subsequently, in each period the seller updates his
belief regarding the fraction of impatient consumers and then posts a price. After the price is posted,
the platform decides whether to promote the seller or one of its competitors. Then, a consumer with
a realized patience type arrives, forms a consideration set, and makes a purchase decision according to
an underlying demand model.
Our model is stylized, and considers a strategic Bayesian seller that operates in a competitive envi-
ronment that is set exogenously, yet allows for tractability in a challenging dynamic problem that is
relevant to many practical settings. Our model captures a fundamental tradeoff faced by the platform,
between maximizing consumer surplus in a present period, and controlling the demand information
revealed to the seller, which may impact the achievable consumer surplus in future periods. The
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tractability of the model allows one to identify how this tradeoff is balanced in equilibrium between a
platform that can influence sales observations, and a strategic seller that learns from these observations.
(2) Characterizing the long-run average optimal platform performance. We observe that fully dis-
closing its private information can be detrimental to the platform. As a method for controlling the
seller’s uncertainty about the fraction of impatient consumers over time, we introduce the notion of
confounding promotion policies. These policies are designed to ensure that the seller’s belief about the
fraction of impatient consumers is fixed throughout the problem horizon (after the initial information
signal is sent), at the cost of diverting consumers away from the best product offering. Leveraging the
structure of confounding promotion policies, we characterize the maximum long-run average consumer
surplus that is achievable by the platform when the seller is myopic.
(3) Policy design and equilibrium analysis. The class of confounding promotion policies plays a key
role in reducing the platform problem to one in which the platform needs to first identify the optimal
confounding promotion policy for a given prior, and then identify the information signal that will result
in an optimal prior. We establish that long-run average optimality can be maintained by optimizing
over a subclass of information design and promotion policies under which the platform provides the
seller with a (random) information signal at the beginning of the horizon, and then follows with a
confounding promotion policy that consists of a static sequence of functions that, given the current
belief, promote at most one price with positive probability. We further show that myopic pricing is a
best response to this platform strategy, thereby establishing an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium
between the platform and the seller. In particular, the platform’s benefit from deviating to any other
joint information design and promotion policy diminishes to zero as the number of consumers grows
large, and the seller cannot gain from deviating to any other dynamic pricing policy at any stage of
the game.
(4) Prescription for identifying efficient platform policies. We provide a prescription for identifying
the platform’s equilibrium strategy given a concrete demand or consumer choice model. This allows
one to identify practical long-run average optimal information design and promotion policies in a broad
class of demand models, and to study the impact of the underlying structure of the demand model
and the platform’s search environment on the design of effective promotion policies and the achievable
consumer surplus.
1.2 Related Literature
By studying the platform’s problem of designing joint information disclosure and promotion policies
in the presence of a seller that dynamically prices and learns from sales observations, our work relates
to several strands of literature in operations and economics.
By modelling a seller who is uncertain about characteristics of consumer demand, our work relates to
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a stream of work that studies dynamic pricing policies in various settings characterized by demand
uncertainty. Examples of such work include Araman and Caldentey (2009), Besbes and Zeevi (2009),
Farias and Van Roy (2010), Harrison et al. (2012), den Boer and Zwart (2014), and Keskin and
Zeevi (2014), among others; see also surveys by Araman and Caldentey (2010) and den Boer (2015)
for an overview. More broadly, the seller’s problem relates to an extensive literature in operations
on sequential decision making under uncertainty in which a decision maker must balance a trade-off
between actions which generate high immediate payoffs with those that facilitate the acquisition of
information that might be essential for maximizing future payoffs. In addition to pricing contexts,
this tradeoff has been studied in various settings, including retail assortment selection (e.g., Caro and
Gallien (2007), Saure´ and Zeevi (2013)) and inventory management (e.g., Huh and Rusmevichientong
(2009), Besbes and Muharremoglu (2013), Besbes et al. (2017)).
The studies above analyze dynamics that are predicated on the assumption that, conditional on the
price selected by the seller, the demand (and more broadly, the underlying cost or payoff function),
is exogenous. The current paper departs from this stream of literature by considering the pricing
dynamics of a learning seller when demand is endogenous and affected by the strategic actions of a
platform. This consideration introduces a significant departure from the aforementioned stream of
literature in terms of modelling, as well as the resulting dynamics.
In particular, most closely related to ours is the work of Harrison et al. (2012), which considers a
Bayesian seller who dynamically posts prices while learning about the underlying (exogenous) demand
model. Their work demonstrates that while in many settings a myopic Bayesian pricing policy can
be near optimal, it can also suffer from incomplete learning if the seller reaches a confounding belief.
In that sense, our work emphasizes the importance of confounding beliefs from the perspective of a
strategic platform with private demand information. We establish that when the demand structure
is subject to the actions and the objectives of the platform, it is used by the platform as a tool to
incentivize low prices. Then, we show that the platform may benefit from concealing the underlying
demand structure from the seller, and in these cases effective platform strategies are in fact designed to
confound the seller at certain beliefs and prevent him from learning the underlying demand structure.
Moreover, while in Harrison et al. (2012) semi-myopic policies (in which the seller does not price
myopically at confounding beliefs) are suggested as a vehicle to avoid incomplete learning, our analysis
implies that a strategic platform will design the demand structure so that a myopic pricing policy
is a best response for the seller, and a deviation to any other dynamic pricing policies, including
semi-myopic ones, is not profitable.
In addition, our work departs from the above stream of work by focusing on a different (yet closely
related) operational tradeoff. The stream of literature above focuses on the tradeoff faced by the seller,
between selecting prices that maximize revenue from sales based on current demand information and
selecting prices that facilitate acquisition of new information that may be essential for maximizing
6
future revenue. On the other hand, the current paper focuses on the counterpart tradeoff that is faced
by the platform: between promoting the best product offering, which maximizes instantaneous con-
sumer welfare but might reveal demand information and reduce the consumer welfare that is achievable
in future periods, and following a promotion policy that conceals demand information at the cost of
diverting consumers to inferior product offerings.
Our model also relates to work studying seller pricing behavior on a variety of platforms that are
designed to facilitate trade between sellers and buyers. For example, Chen et al. (2016) analyze the
pricing behavior of sellers on Amazon and identify sellers who use algorithms to dynamically update
their posted price. Li et al. (2016) consider the pricing behavior of sellers on Airbnb and observe
that there are substantial differences from “professional” hosts who often update their price and “non-
professional” hosts who update their price much less frequently.
In our formulation, the interaction between the platform and seller begins with a certain disclosure
of information but continues afterwards. Therefore, the platform must jointly design the signaling
mechanism in conjunction with a promotion policy to influence the seller’s ability to learn dynamically
through sales observations. In that sense, our work relates to the work on information design in the
Bayesian Persuasion framework originating in the work of Segal and Rayo (2010) and Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), and more broadly, to the work on repeated games of incomplete information in
Aumann and Maschler (1995), which studies how an informed player’s actions influence the learning
of an uninformed player. In doing so, our work relates to the growing field of communication and
information design in operational settings including queueing (Lingenbrink and Iyer 2019), networks
(Candogan and Drakopoulos (2017), Candogan (2019)), inventory (Drakopoulos et al. 2018), and
exploration in platforms (Papanastasiou et al. (2017), Bimpikis and Papanastasiou (2019)). The
current paper departs from this line of work in terms of both the application domain and the setting.
In particular, the above studies typically consider a static formulation whereas in our setting the
information signal is followed by a dynamic interaction between the platform and the seller through
which further information may be revealed to the seller.
We model consumers with heterogenous search costs that impact the number of products they con-
sider. Therefore, the platform can influence demand for sellers through its promotion decisions. The
phenomenon that consumers are more likely to consider and purchase products that are ranked higher
or given more prominence on a webpage has been documented empirically in many settings; see, e.g.
Kim et al. (2010) and Chen and Yao (2016) in the context of consumer products, as well as Besbes
et al. (2016) in the context of content recommendations in media sites. Moreover, the implications of
consumer search behavior on optimal product rankings has been studied given different assumptions
on the consumer search behavior. For example, Derakhshan et al. (2018) study how to optimally
rank products with exogenous ‘intrinsic utilities’ given a two-stage model of consumer search. Ferreira
et al. (2019) study how to optimally rank products when consumer preferences are ex-ante unknown
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to the platform, but it can learn from consumer engagement decisions. Our model differs from this
stream of literature as the platform’s promotion decisions in our model not only affect the considera-
tion set of consumers but are also used as a tool to incentivize low prices. Thus, our work relates more
closely to literature that studies platform recommendations and the design of search environments.
For example, Hagiu and Jullien (2011) study how a revenue maximizing platform directs consumer
search and identify how the platform may direct consumers to their less preferred product because it
incentivizes sellers to lower their prices by altering the composition of consumers who consider their
product. Our model and analysis identify a new reason for diverting consumers, namely, that when
facing a seller with incomplete demand information who is learning from sales observations, a platform
may divert consumers to prevent the seller from learning the underlying demand structure. Dinerstein
et al. (2018) empirically analyze a similar trade-off between directing consumers to desired products
with strengthening incentives for sellers to lower prices in the context of the eBay search environment.
Finally, we would like to distinguish the notion of promotions studied in the current paper from the one
that has been studied in retail management; see, e.g., Cohen et al. (2017) and references therein. In this
stream of work, promotions refer to times at which a retailer temporarily reduces its price to increase
sales. In our framework, however, demand is affected by both the price posted by the seller, and the
prominence the product receives in the platform’s web page or search results. We use promotion to
refer to the platform’s decision to increase the visibility of a seller to consumers (providing the seller
with the increased demand associated with the improved visibility). Thus, promotions are used by
the platform as a tool to set incentives for the seller to reduce its price, and the resulting price is
determined endogenously.
2 Model
We consider a stylized model where a seller sequentially posts prices on a platform which, at each
period, chooses whether or not to promote the seller. The platform privately knows the fraction of
consumers that consider only the promoted product and can strategically disclose information about
it to the seller at the beginning of the horizon. The seller does not know this fraction a priori, and in
that sense has incomplete demand information. Throughout the horizon the seller can learn from sales
observations, but its sales are influenced by the platform’s strategic promotion decisions, which are
not directly observed by the seller. We next provide an overview of the model, followed by a detailed
description of each model component. Our formulation considers a broad family of demand models,
and examples of concrete demand structures are considered in §5.1 and Appendix §A.2. A few model
assumptions and extensions are discussed in §2.1.
Overview. We assume that T consumers arrive sequentially to the platform to purchase at most one
product each. Before the first period, the platform commits to (i) a signaling mechanism σ that may
communicate information about the fraction of impatient consumers to the seller, and (ii) a promotion
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policy α; both of these will be described in further detail below. The platform then privately observes
the true fraction of impatient consumers φ ∈ {φL, φH}, where 0 < φL < φH < 1 and where φ = φH
is drawn with commonly known probability µ0. Then, φ is fixed throughout the horizon, and the
platform sends a signal drawn according to σ. See Figure 2 for a summary of these dynamics.
Period 0 Period 1 Begins
Platform
Commits to
α, σ
Platform
Observes Fraction
φ
Seller
Observes Signal,
s ∼ σ(φ)
Figure 2: Dynamics before horizon begins (t = 0)
In each period t = 1, ..., T , prior to the consumer arrival, the seller sets a price pt ∈ P and then
the platform makes a decision at ∈ {0, 1} whether to promote the seller or one of its competitors.
Consumer t then arrives with an independently drawn patience type that determines her consideration
set of products. Impatient consumers only consider the seller promoted by the platform, and patient
consumers consider all available products. Therefore, φ captures the value of promotion, which is a
priori unknown to the seller. Based on her consideration set and an underlying consumer choice model,
consumer t makes a decision yt ∈ {0, 1} whether to purchase the seller’s product or not, and the seller
observes its own sales outcome. See Figure 2 for a summary of these dynamics.
Period t Begins Period t+ 1 Begins
Seller
Updates Belief
µt
Seller
Sets Price
pt
Platform Makes
Promotion Decision
at
Consumer Arrives &
Purchases (or not)
yt
Figure 3: Dynamics at each period t = 1, ..., T
Sellers. Each period, the seller sets a price pt ∈ P , where P is a convex subset of R. At the end of
each period, the seller observes the feedback yt ∈ {0, 1}, indicating whether the consumer bought his
product or not. Without loss, we normalize the cost of the seller to be 0, so the seller’s payoff as a
function of his price and the consumer’s purchase decision is:
v(p, y) =
p, if y = 10, otherwise (1)
Consumers. When consumer t arrives, she is impatient with probability φ and patient with proba-
bility 1 − φ. Depending on her patience type, the consumer forms her consideration set of products
and observes the (possibly noisy) value of each. The consumer then purchases from the product with
the highest value in her consideration set, if that value is greater than the value of not purchasing. For
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a price p ∈ P , a commonly known competition parameter c, and a promotion decision of the platform
a ∈ {0, 1}, the probability that a consumer purchases from the seller is:
ρ(p, a, c) = P(y = 1|p, a) =

ρ¯(p, c), if the consumer is patient
ρ¯0(p), if the consumer is impatient and a = 1
0, if the consumer is impatient and a = 0.
(2)
We make the following assumption on the demand function.
Assumption 1 (Demand).
(a) ρ¯(p, c) and ρ¯0(p) are decreasing and Lipschitz continuous in p.
(b) ρ¯(p, c) and ρ¯0(p) are strictly concave in p.
(c) ρ¯0(p) ≥ ρ(p, c) for all c ∈ R.
Assumption 1 is very mild and is satisfied by many common demand models, including logit, mixed
logit, and probit, among others. Part (b) of the assumption ensures that there is a unique optimal
price. Part (c) of the assumption simply states that the probability of purchasing from the seller is
greater, at every price, when the seller does not face competition.
Platform. Before consumer t arrives, the platform observes the seller’s posted price pt and selects
whether to promote him or one of his competitors; we denote this decision by an indicator at ∈ {0, 1}.
The platform’s payoff in each period is the expected consumer surplus, which is a function of the
seller’s price, the promotion decision, the consumer type, and level of competition, and is equal to:
W (p, a, c) =

W¯ (p, c), if the consumer is patient
W¯0(p), if the consumer is impatient and a = 1
W¯c, if the consumer is impatient and a = 0,
(3)
where W¯ and W¯0 are known functions and W¯
C ∈ R is the consumer surplus generated by the compe-
tition. We make the following mild assumption on consumer surplus.
Assumption 2 (Consumer Surplus). W¯ (p, c) and W¯0(p) are decreasing and Lipschitz continuous in p.
Moreover, W¯ (p, c) ≥ W¯0(p), for all p.
Strategies and Histories. Given a space X , let ∆(X ) be the space of probability measures on
X . At the beginning of the horizon, before the observation of φ, the platform commits to a strategy
that consists of two components. Denoting a set of possible signals by S, the first component of the
platform’s strategy is a signaling mechanism, σ : {φL, φH} → ∆(S), which maps the true fraction of
impatient consumers to a distribution over signals. We denote the realized signal by s ∈ S and the space
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of signaling mechanisms by Σ. The second component of the platform’s strategy is a vector of mappings
corresponding to the platform’s dynamic sequence of promotion decisions. Specifically, it commits to a
dynamic promotion policy α = {αt}Tt=1 where αt : P ×{φL, φH}×∆({φL, φH})→ ∆({0, 1}) specifies
a (possibly randomized) platform promotion decision in period t as a function of the seller’s price,
the type φ, and the seller’s beliefs about φ. We denote the realized promotion decision at time t
by at ∈ {0, 1} and the set of dynamic promotion policies by A.
At the beginning of the first period, the seller’s information consists of the primitives that are common
knowledge (µ0, φH , φL), the functions ρ and W , the platform joint strategy (α, σ), and the signal sent
by the platform, s. In each period, the seller observes its own price pt and its own demand realization
yt. We denote the information available at the beginning of period t as:
h1 = 〈s,α, σ〉 , and ht =
〈
s,α, σ, (pt′ , yt′)
t−1
t′=1
〉
, for t > 1.
We denote by {Ht = σ(ht), t = 1, ..., T} the filtration associated with the process {ht}Tt=1, and we de-
note the set of possible histories at the beginning of period t as Ht = {φL, φH}×A×Σ×(P × {0, 1})t−1.
In each period, based on the history of information that is available, the seller first updates his be-
lief about φ according to Bayes’ rule. We denote the seller’s belief system by µ = {µt}Tt=1 where
µt : Ht → [0, 1] is the probability that he assigns to {φ = φH}. The seller’s (mixed) strategy is a
vector of non-anticipating mappings pi = {pit}Tt=1, where each pit : Ht → ∆(P ). Denote the set of
non-anticipating seller strategies as Π. For simplicity we begin our analysis by assuming that the seller
posts a price according to a myopic Bayesian policy pi = {pit}Tt=1 which satisfies:3
P
(
pt ∈ arg max
p∈P
Eat,yt,φ (v(p, yt)|ht = h,α, σ)
∣∣∣∣pit) = 1. (4)
The consideration of the general class of dynamic pricing policies will be advanced in the equilibrium
analysis that is detailed in §4.3.
For a given promotion policy α ∈ A and signaling mechanism σ ∈ Σ, at each period t there may
be multiple prices that maximize the seller’s expected revenue in that period. For given signal and
promotion policy (α, σ), we denote by ΠM (α, σ) ⊂ Π the set of myopic Bayesian pricing policies that
satisfy (4) in every period t. Within this set, we focus our analysis on a seller pricing policy that
maximizes consumer surplus.4 This pricing policy, denoted by pi∗, satisfies:
pi∗ ∈ arg max
pi∈ΠM (α,σ)
Wα,σ,piT (µ0). (5)
3Considering myopic pricing decisions reflects a fair level of seller sophistication as it requires the seller to constantly
update beliefs and prices. Moreover, in many settings with uncertainty about demand, myopic pricing policies were
shown to achieve good performance in terms of maximizing long-term payoffs (see, e.g., related discussion in Harrison
et al. 2012).
4This is akin to considering sender preferred equilibria which is standard in models of Bayesian Persuasion; see related
discussion in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) as well as Drakopoulos et al. (2018).
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Payoffs. Given the elements of the platform strategy α ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ, and seller policy pi ∈ Π, the
platform’s expected payoff is:
Wα,σ,piT (µ0) = E
(
T∑
t=1
W (pt, at, c)
∣∣∣∣∣α, σ,pi
)
,
where the expectation is with respect to (p,a,y, s, φ). The seller’s expected (present and future) payoff
at period t and history h ∈ Ht is:
V α,σ,pit (h) = E
(
T∑
t′=t
v(pt, yt)
∣∣∣∣∣ht = h,α, σ,pi
)
. (6)
As mentioned, our formulation allows for a broad class of choice models. In §5.1 we analyze an example
of a logit model, and examples of other demand models are discussed in Appendix §A.2.
2.1 Discussion of Model Assumptions
Platform Maximizes Consumer Surplus. For many platforms, long-term revenue is primarily
driven by attracting consumers to the platform. The approach of maximizing consumer surplus has
been considered in previous models of platform design (see e.g. Dinerstein et al. 2018 and references
therein). Considering a platform that, on the other hand, seeks to drive more sellers to the platform
would, perhaps, be interesting to model as well. In this case, the platform would seek to incentivize
the seller to set high prices as in a collusive equilibrium.
One Learning Seller. For the sake of tractability, we focus on a setting where there is a single seller
who is learning and all others set the same price each period. We note that there is also evidence
that in settings such as Airbnb, there are a mix of professional and unprofessional sellers where the
unprofessional ones update prices much less frequently (Li et al., 2016). While it is an interesting
extension to consider multiple learning sellers, it would require either complex belief updates or the
fairly strong assumption that each seller observes each consumer’s purchase decision.
Patience and search costs. To simplify exposition we characterize consumers by a patience type,
determining whether they consider only the promoted product or all the available products. While we
do not model search costs in an explicit consumer utility model, we note that, under simple assumptions
on the search costs of consumers, the above consumer behavior could be maintained as an outcome of
common consumer utility models that explicitly account for search costs.
Platform leads, seller follows. Our model assumes that a platform commits to a dynamic promotion
decision and signaling mechanism upfront. Therefore, in each period, the seller knows the probability
of being promoted as a function of the price it sets, given the true value of φ. The platform’s ability
to commit to a strategy is in line with the information design literature, e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow
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(2011). These dynamics can be further motivated by the fact that platforms may host many thousands
of products and sellers and cannot engage dynamically with each of them separately. Instead, the
platform can commit to a promotion policy upfront, and let each seller react to it in equilibrium.
No observation of promotion decision. Our model and analysis are motivated by settings where
many consumers arrive to the platform. In this case, it would be difficult for a seller to track how
prominently their product is featured to each consumer. We do, however, assume that the seller knows
how many potential consumers have arrived and how many of them purchased its product, which
relies on market level characteristics. If the seller could observe promotion decisions, the seller would
quickly learn the true value of φ regardless of its pricing policy. Then, the optimal long-run average
consumer surplus could be achieved by simply revealing the value of φ through a truthful signaling
mechanism. It is often that case that the consumer surplus achievable by the platform when the seller
has access to promotion decisions is lower than the one achievable when sellers only observe sales.
Further discussion on this comparison and its implications is advanced in §6.1.
3 Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus
In this section, before proposing and analyzing candidate platform strategies, we first characterize the
maximum long-run average consumer surplus that is achievable by the platform. The fundamental
tension at play is that the seller’s beliefs about the fraction of patient consumers impacts the platform’s
ability to exert incentives on the seller’s pricing decisions through its promotion policy. The platform’s
promotion policy, in turn, impacts the consumer surplus in the current period through its impact on
the seller’s pricing decision in that period, but it also affects the information revealed to the seller,
and therefore the seller’s beliefs in future periods. Therefore, the promotion policy deployed by the
platform in a given period impacts consumer surplus in that period as well as in subsequent periods.
3.1 The Insufficiency of Truthfully Disclosing the Promotion Value
To develop intuition on how the platform’s information disclosure policy impacts its ability to influence
the seller’s price, we first consider a setting where the platform reveals φ, the fraction of impatient
consumers, truthfully. Since under a truthful signal, both the optimal promotion policy and a Bayesian
myopic pricing policy are static, we set T = 1 for simplicity. The platform’s ability to incentivize a
low price and increase the expected consumer surplus is constrained by the seller’s option to maximize
its revenue from selling to patient consumers, which can be achieved by setting the price
p∗ := arg max
p∈P
pρ¯(p, c). (7)
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Note that due to Assumption 1, stating that pρ¯(p, c) is strictly concave, p∗ is unique. The probability
that a patient consumer arrives is (1 − φ), so the seller’s maximum expected payoff from selling
exclusively to patient consumers is (1 − φ)p∗ρ(p∗, c). To incentivize the seller to set a lower price
p < p∗ and increase the expected consumer surplus, the platform must promote the seller so that
the seller’s loss in revenue from patient consumers is overshadowed by revenue that is gained from
impatient consumers. Under a truthful signal, the platform’s optimal promotion policy therefore
solves the following problem for each value of φ:
max
p∈P,
α∈[0,1]
φ(W¯C + α(W¯ (p)− W¯C)) + (1− φ)W¯ (p, c)
s.t. φαpρ¯0(p) ≥ (1− φ)(p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)− pρ¯(p, c)),
(8)
where p is the price induced by an the optimal promotion policy, and α is the probability of promoting
the seller at that price. One may observe that in order to induce the seller to set price p, the seller’s
revenue from impatient consumers at price p must be at least as large as its loss in revenue from
pricing sub-optimally to patient consumers. Moreover, as φ increases, the platform can exert stronger
incentives on the seller’s price because it effectively controls the consideration set formed by a larger
fraction of consumers, and because selling exclusively to patient consumers is less valuable as there are
fewer of them.
When φ is uncertain, the constraint on the seller’s price in (8) must only hold in expectation. This
means that the platform’s ability to incentivize a low price depends on the seller’s belief about the
fraction of impatient consumers φ. In particular, as the seller’s belief that φ = φH increases, the
platform can exert stronger incentives on the seller’s price. Therefore, by revealing φ truthfully when
it is a priori uncertain, the platform benefits if φ = φH but is worse off if φ = φL.
In general (depending on the shape of W and ρ), the potential gain from truthfully revealing that
φ = φH might be small relative to the potential loss from truthfully revealing that φ = φL, and
therefore it might not be optimal to truthfully reveal φ. Instead, the expected consumer surplus can
in fact be greater when the platform reveals no information and ‘pools’ outcomes across the states
{φL, φH}. By doing so, the platform incentivizes the same price, independently of the true value of φ,
because the constraint on the seller’s pricing decision is determined by its belief about φ.
With multiple periods and uncertainty over φ, the seller’s belief similarly affects its pricing incentives
in each period. However, the seller’s belief is affected not only by the platform’s original information
signal, but also previous sales observations. Therefore, in order to maximize the expected future
consumer surplus in cases where no (or partial) information disclosure is optimal, the platform’s may
consider promotion policies that are designed to ensure that the seller’s sales observations convey no
additional information about φ. However, restricting the information content of sales observations may
come at a cost because it imposes additional constraints on the platform’s promotion policy. In fact,
14
in order to guarantee that sales observations convey no information about φ, the platform may have
to divert impatient consumers away from the best product offering.
3.2 Confounding Promotion Policies
The above discussion illustrates that the platform faces a tradeoff in designing its promotion policy
between increasing the consumer surplus at the current period and limiting the information contained
in sales observations, which in turn impacts consumer surplus in future periods. A class of promotion
policies that are a key for balancing this tradeoff are those which confound the seller’s learning in all
periods t = 1, . . . , T ; these policies are fundamental for determining the achievable long-run average
consumer surplus. We next define the notion of confounding promotion policies, which are designed
to prevent a myopic seller’s belief from updating based on the sales observation in each period.
Definition 1 (Confounding Promotion Policies). For each belief µ1 ∈ [0, 1], the set of confounding
promotion policies AC(µ1) are those which prevent the seller’s belief from updating throughout periods
t = 1, . . . , T .
AC(µ1) = {α ∈ A : P(µt(ht) = µ1|α,pi∗) = 1, ∀t = 1, ..., T} .
Definition 1 encompasses the two ways for a sales observation to contain no new information about the
true fraction of impatient consumers, φ. The first one is trivial; if the seller knows the true value with
certainty, that is, µ1 ∈ {0, 1}, then sales observations do not affect his belief, and one has AC(µ1) = A.
On the other hand, if µ1 ∈ (0, 1), then the platform may prevent the sales observation from conveying
information by ensuring that the probability of a sale is independent of φ. To do so, the platform must
design α so that in each period t, at the price p set by a myopic seller, one obtains:
P (yt = 1|φ = φH ,α, pt = p) = P (yt = 1|φ = φL,α, pt = p) (9)
In any given period, a patient consumer arrives and purchases with probability (1 − φ)ρ¯(p, c) while
an impatient consumer arrives and considers the seller with probability φP(α(φ, p, µ) = 1), and then
purchases with probability φρ¯0(p). Since (φH−φL)ρ¯(p, c) > 0, the probability that a patient consumer
purchases in period t always depends on φ, and α(φ, p, µ) must be chosen so as to equate the total
probability of a sale. In particular, the platform must promote the seller to more consumers if φ = φH
in order to equate the total probability that the consumer purchases from the seller such that:
φHP(α(φH , p, µ) = 1)ρ¯0(p) + (1− φH)ρ¯(p, c) = φLP(α(φL, p, µ) = 1)ρ¯0(p) + (1− φL)ρ¯(p, c). (10)
We next provide an example of a confounding promotion policy, which also shows that for all µ1 ∈ [0, 1]
the set AC(µ1) is non-empty. Note that this policy is one out of possibly many different confounding
policies, each of which may generate a different consumer surplus and seller revenue. Recall the price,
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p∗, which is defined in (7) as the unique price that the seller would set if only sold to patient consumers.
Note that p∗ it is independent of the seller’s belief about φ. Define α¯ = {α¯t}Tt=1 where for all t:
α¯t(p, φ, µ) = 1 w.p.

(
φH−φL
φH
)(
ρ¯(p∗,c)
ρ¯0(p∗)
)
, if p = p∗ and φ = φH
0, otherwise
(11)
Note that this is a well-defined policy as 0 < (φH−φL)φH < 1 by definition, and 0 <
ρ¯(p∗,c)
ρ¯0(p∗)
< 1 by
Assumption 1. One may observe that p∗ is the unique myopically optimal price to set in response to
α¯t at each period t and for all µ. Moreover, by construction:
P (α¯t(p, φH , µ) = 1)φH ρ¯(p
∗, 0) + (1− φH)ρ¯(p∗, c) = (1− φL)ρ¯(p∗, c),
so the probability of a sale at price p∗ is independent of the true value of φ. Thus, the seller’s
posterior belief will not update throughout the horizon, and α¯ ∈ AC(µ) for all µ ∈ [0, 1]. In general,
for a promotion policy to confound the seller and prevent him from learning from sales observations,
the platform must take a sub-optimal action with positive probability, by diverting some impatient
consumers away from the product that generates the largest expected consumer surplus.
For a given posterior belief µ1 ∈ [0, 1], define the maximum consumer surplus generated by a con-
founding promotion policy as:
WC(µ1) := max
α∈AC(µ1)
1
T
E
(
T∑
t=1
W (pt, at, c)
∣∣∣∣∣α,pi∗, µ1
)
. (12)
3.3 Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus
For any function f : R→ R, define co(f) as the concavification of f :5
co(f)(µ) := sup{z|(µ, z) ∈ Conv(f)},
where Conv(f) denotes the convex hull of the set {(x, t) : t ≤ f(x)}. The following result character-
izes the maximum long-run average consumer surplus generated by a dynamic promotion policy and
signaling mechanism.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus). For all µ0 ∈ [0, 1],
lim
T→∞
sup
α∈A,
σ∈Σ
1
T
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) = co(W
C(µ0)).
5This function appears often in the information design literature (see e.g. Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011)).
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While the details of the proof are deferred to Appendix §B, we next provide the key ideas of proof. To
prove that the left hand side is bounded from above by co(WC), we show that the expected number
of periods in which the promotion policy generates a consumer surplus strictly greater than WC(µt)
is finite. This result is established through two lemmas. First, we show that for any  > 0 there
exists δ > 0 such that for any period t and belief µt, if the promotion policy αt generates an expected
consumer surplus greater than WC(µt) + , then at the myopically optimal price, |P(yt = 1|φ =
φH , αt) − P(yt = 1|φ = φL, αt)| > δ. Second, we show that for any δ > 0, the expected value of the
seller’s belief converges to the true value of φ exponentially fast in the number of periods in which
the probabilities of a sale under φ = φH and φ = φL differ by δ; see Lemma 2 (Appendix B) for
more details.6 Combining these two results we establish that as the number of consumers grows large,
the expected number of periods in which the promotion policy generates a consumer surplus strictly
greater than WC(µt) is finite. Finally, we show that the optimal signal generates a consumer surplus
equal to co(WC)(µ0). By constructing a policy (α, σ) for which
1
TW
α,σ,pi∗
T (µ0) = co(W
C(µ0)) for all
T ≥ 1, we establish that the left hand side is also bounded from below by co(WC). We elaborate more
on this construction in the proof of Theorem 3.
The characterization in Theorem 1 follows from the fact that for any platform promotion policy, the
seller’s belief µt asymptotically converges to a limit belief as the number of periods grows large, and
the expected consumer surplus that is achievable at this limit belief determines the long-run average
expected consumer surplus. Thus, effective policy design prioritizes long-term information revelation
considerations over concerns about short-term payoffs. However, it remains to understand the structure
of WC(µ0), co(W
C(µ0)), and long-run average optimal platform policies. In particular, characterizing
optimal information disclosure and promotion policies requires identifying the set of seller beliefs for
which it is optimal for the platform to confound the seller’s learning. For µ ∈ {0, 1} the optimal policy
confounds the seller by our definition, but it remains to understand when should a promotion policy
confound the seller at an interior belief µ ∈ (0, 1) by actively diverting consumers away from the best
product. We analyze these points in the next section.
4 Efficient Classes of Policies
Leveraging the insights from the characterization of the optimal long-run average payoff in Theorem 1,
in this section we introduce simple classes of platform policies that are practical to implement and
achieve long-run average optimality when the seller is myopic. Moreover, we establish that a myopic
pricing policy is, in fact, the seller’s best response to these platform policies at every period.
6Lemma 2 generalizes Lemma A.1 of (Harrison et al., 2012) by showing that their result extends to pricing policies
where the time of the nth informative price is random.
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4.1 Single-Price Promotion Policies with Reduced Signal Space
We first restrict our analysis to policies under which the platform promotes only one price with positive
probability. These policies are practical to implement as the platform need only to communicate a
single price and the probability of promotion that corresponds to it.7
Definition 2 (Single-Price Promotion Policies). Single-price promotion policies are those which, given
any belief µt, promote at most one price with positive probability in each period. We denote the set of
single-price promotion policies by AP ⊂ A, formally defined as follows:
AP := {α ∈ A : ∀t = 1, ..., T, µ ∈ [0, 1], ∃p¯t(µ) ∈ [0, q] s.t. P(αt(φ, p, µ) = 0) = 1,∀p 6= p¯t(µ)} .
Moreover, we let ΣS denote the induced set of simple signaling mechanisms defined under the reduced
set of signals S = {φL, φH}. The next theorem establishes that restricting the promotion policies to
AP is without loss, and that restricting the signaling mechanisms to ΣS is without loss of optimality.
Theorem 2 (Payoff Equivalence of Single-Price Promotion Policies with Reduced Signal Set). For
any T ≥ 1,α ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ, there exists a single-price promotion policy, α′ ∈ AP such that:
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) = W
α′,σ,pi∗
T (µ0).
Moreover, there exists a signaling mechanism σ′ ∈ ΣS such that:
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) ≤Wα,σ
′,pi∗
T (µ0).
It is without loss to consider the set of policies where the platform promotes a single price because
the seller does not have private information. Thus, given any promotion policy, the platform can
simply determine the seller’s corresponding optimal price, and then design a promotion policy where
this is the only price promoted. Furthermore, we prove that a signaling mechanism induced by the
reduced signal set generates at least as high of a consumer surplus by showing that at any prior µ0,
the optimal posterior distribution consists of at most two beliefs. Thus, the platform only needs two
possible signals.
4.2 Simple Promotion Policies with Reduced Signal Space
We next further reduce the set of platform promotion policies to those which are ‘simple’ and show
that it is without loss of long-run average optimality to restrict attention to these policies.
7We note that one could equivalently formulate this class of promotion policies as a threshold policy where the
platform communicates the maximum price that is promoted with positive probability.
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Definition 3 (Simple Promotion Policies). The set of simple promotion policies AS consists of all
static, single price, confounding policies, that is, policies where α ∈ AC(µ) ∩ AP for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and
α is static (that is, αt = α1,∀t = 1, ..., T ).
We note that the promotion policy α¯ defined by (7) and (11) is not only confounding, but single-
price and static, and therefore AS is non-empty. Considering only the simple class of promotion and
signaling mechanisms (AS ,ΣS) significantly reduces the set of policies to a class of policies that are
intuitive and relatively easy to implement. For the seller, the problem is essentially static after he
updates his belief based on the signal sent by the platform. His belief never changes and the optimal
price remains the same in every period. Moreover, the platform policy promotes only one price so the
determination of the optimal price is tractable. In referring to simple policies, we will typically leave
their dependance on T implicit because they are static.
4.3 Approximate Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
So far we have restricted the seller’s pricing policies to the set of Bayesian myopic pricing policies ΠM .
We next proceed to consider the general set of non-anticipating pricing policies Π (defined in §2). The
following theorem establishes that there exists a simple platform policy α ∈ AS , σ ∈ ΣS such that
(α, σ,pi∗) is an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where pi∗ is defined in (5) as the Bayesian
myopic pricing policy that maximizes consumer surplus.
Theorem 3 (Approximate Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Simple Strategies). There exists a simple
platform policy α ∈ AS , σ ∈ ΣS and a positive, decreasing function  : N → R+ with lim
T→∞
(T ) = 0,
such that for any T ≥ 1:
1
T
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) ≥
1
T
Wα
′,σ′,pi∗
T (µ0)− (T ), ∀α′ ∈ A, σ′ ∈ Σ. (13)
Moreover, the myopic pricing policy pi∗ is a best-response to (α, σ) at each period t = 1, . . . , T and
every history, h ∈ Ht, consistent with (α, σ). That is,
V α,σ,pi
∗
t (h) ≥ V α,σ,pi
′
t (h) , ∀pi′ ∈ Π. (14)
To prove Theorem 3, we first establish that there exists a simple promotion policy α ∈ AS such that
for all µ1 ∈ [0, 1], the expected consumer surplus equals WC(µ1) in every period. We then prove that
an optimal simple signal exists, using Theorem 2 and adapting standard analysis in information design
to our setting, to show that a simple policy generates expected consumer surplus co(WC)(µ1) in each
period. Finally, to complete the result, we establish that pi∗ is a best-response to an optimal simple
policy at all histories and time periods by showing that the seller’s expected continuation payoff is
independent of the price he sets.
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Theorem 3 implies that the platform and seller strategies form an approximate Bayesian Nash equiib-
rium. Given that the seller uses a Bayesian myopic pricing policy, the platform’s benefit from deviating
to any other information disclosure and promotion strategy diminishes to zero when the number of
consumers grows large, and given that the platform uses the optimal simple policy, the seller cannot
gain from deviating to any other dynamic pricing policy (including non-myopic ones) at any period
of the game. The equilibrium concept is not ‘perfect,’ however, as we do not require the seller to
price optimally at off-path histories where the platform deviates to another policy; in particular, the
Bayesian myopic pricing policy is not a best-response to every α ∈ A. We instead only show that the
seller’s policy is optimal at histories consistent with the buyer’s equilibrium strategy; in other words,
at histories where the buyer plays its equilibrium strategy α, σ. For any finite T , the equilibrium is
approximate, in the sense that (T ) > 0, as the platform can strictly benefit by deviating to another
policy. One may observe that in period T , the platform can increase the expected consumer surplus by
designing a promotion policy that ignores the confounding constraint because disclosing information
in the last period has no adverse effect. However, the extent to which the platform can do so is small
relative to the total consumer surplus over a long horizon.
Notably, Theorem 3 implies that when the platform uses the best simple promotion policy, semi-
myopic policies (see, e.g., Harrison et al. 2012) which allow the seller to learn by avoiding confounding
prices are not effective deviations for the seller. The platform designs an optimal simple policy so
that the promotion policy reacts to the seller’s learning in such a way that learning is not valuable
for the seller. In particular, the promotion policy is designed so that the seller’s payoff in each period
equals the maximum expected revenue from selling exclusively to patient consumers: (1−φL− (φH −
φL)µt)p
∗ρ(p∗, c). One may observe that this revenue is linear in µt. Since the seller’s beliefs µt are
a martingale (as the seller is Bayesian) and the seller’s expected continuation value is linear in µt,
learning generates no value in expectation for the seller, and the myopic pricing policy is optimal.
Theorems 2 and 3 both identify reductions of the space of policies that have limited effect on the
achievable payoffs. Theorem 2 shows that for all T ≥ 1 it is without loss of optimality to consider
single price policies and simple signaling mechanisms. Thus, in characterizing an optimal policy, we
only need consider the set of single-price promotion policies and signaling mechanisms that are induced
by the simple signal set {φL, φH}. Theorem 3, on the other hand, implies that considering an even
further reduced class of policies is without loss of long-run average optimality and that the Bayesian
myopic pricing policy is in fact optimal for the seller.
In the next section we turn to providing a procedure for identify practical long-run average optimal
platform policies for a given demand model, and demonstrate this procedure using a commonly studied
discrete choice model.
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5 Designing Long-Run Average Optimal Platform Policies
Theorem 3 establishes that long-run average optimality is achievable in the class of joint simple (that is,
static, confounding, and single-price) promotion policies and simple signaling mechanisms. However,
even having reduced the set of policies to consider, the space of static, confounding policies remains
quite large. In this section, we characterize how to solve for the optimal simple policy described by
Theorem 3. In general, given any concrete demand structure that satisfies the mild conditions in
Assumption 1, one can design the optimal simple policy in three steps (i) characterizing the function
WC(µ) and the associated optimal promotion policy for all µ; (ii) determining co(WC(µ)) based on
the characterization of WC(µ); and (iii) determining an optimal simple signal given µ0, W
C(µ), and
co(WC)(µ). Working backwards through this procedure, the third step is straightforward as we can
characterize the optimal simple signal:
σ′(φL) =
φL, w.p.
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
φH , w.p. 1−
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
) σ′(φH) =
φL, w.p.
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
φH , w.p. 1−
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
) (15)
where µ′ = sup{µ ≤ µ0 : co(WC(µ)) = WC(µ)} and µ′ = inf{µ ≥ µ0 : co(WC(µ)) = WC(µ)}.
In general, solving for the concavification of a general function can be complex; however, we show
below that for many demand models of practical interest, WC(µ) is concave on the interior (0, 1)
which makes solving for co(WC) a simple exercise. Moreover, in many demand and consumer choice
models that are of practical interest one may characterize WC(µ) analytically in closed form, which
simplifies these steps. However, even when the underlying demand model does not allow for such
analytical characterization, one may characterize WC(µ) numerically and then follow steps (ii) and
(iii). Characterizing WC(µ) is typically the hardest step in this process. Given µ, the platform must
solve the following optimization problem:
max
α∈AS
1
T
E
(
T∑
t=1
W (pt, at, c)
∣∣∣∣∣α,pi∗, µ
)
(16)
Again, AS remains a large space of policies, but we can simplify the problem in several steps. First,
because simple policies are static, one may reduce the analysis to a single-period. Second, by Theo-
rem 2, for a fixed µ, the promotion and pricing policies can be characterized using only three variables:
the optimal price p ∈ P , and the probability of promotion for each realized value of φ, αφ ∈ [0, 1] for
φ ∈ {φL, φH}. Moreover, we observe that one may remove the dependence on one of the two latter
quantities through the confounding constraint. If µ ∈ (0, 1), then given a promotion probability αφL
and price p, the confounding constraint fully defines αφH :
αφH =
(
φH − φL
φH
)(
ρ¯(p, c)
ρ¯0(p)
)
+ αφL
(
φL
φH
)
. (17)
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In the case that µ ∈ {0, 1}, one of αφL or αφH does not affect the outcome and can be ignored; for
simplicity we proceed describing the problem in terms of αφL assuming µ ∈ (0, 1) but the method for
determining WC(0) and WC(1) is essentially identical. Finally, the consumer surplus is decreasing in
the seller’s price p by Assumption 2, so given an αφL ∈ [0, 1], the optimal price is the smallest price
that is myopically optimal. To determine the smallest, myopically optimal price, one can observe that
given belief µ, the seller will never a set a price that generates less expected revenue than piO(µ) :=
p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ) where p∗ is defined in (7). This expression is the maximum expected
revenue that the seller can generate by selecting a price that is not promoted. Thus, we can define the
optimal price as a function of αφL :
pˆ(µ, αφL) := min{p : (1− φL)pρ¯(p, c) + φLαφLpρ¯(p, 0) ≥ piO(µ)}. (18)
One may observe that pˆ(µ, αφL) exists and is continuous in µ and αφL , though we establish it formally
in the proof of Theorem 3. With these reductions, for each belief µ ∈ [0, 1] the relevant optimization
problem has a single decision variable, αφL ∈ [0, 1], and the objective equals:
W ∗(µ, αφL) :=(W¯0(pˆ(µ, αφL))− W¯c)
(
µ(φH − φL) ρ¯(pˆ(µ, αφL), c)
ρ¯0((pˆ(µ, αφL))
+ φLαφL
)
+ W¯ (pˆ(µ, αφL), c)(1− φL − µ(φH − φL)).
(19)
Thus, for each belief µ the platform solves:
max
αφL∈[0,1]
W ∗(µ, αφL). (20)
For a given belief µ, the function W ∗(µ, αφL) captures the effect of the platform’s policy on the
consumer surplus through a single variable, αφL . Changing αφL has three potential effects on the
consumer surplus, and W ∗(µ, αφL) captures the total change.
(1) Direct effect on all consumers. (Incentivizing low prices) One can establish, see the
proof of Theorem 3, that pˆ(µ, αφL) is decreasing in αφL for all µ. Thus by increasing
the probability of promotion, the platform incentivizes the seller to set a lower price by
increasing the expected consumer traffic that is directed to the seller; this effect always has
a positive impact on consumer surplus for all consumers.
(2) Direct effect on impatient consumers (if φ = φL). Increasing αφL directly impacts the
expected consumer surplus by altering the fraction of impatient consumers who consider
the seller’s product when φ = φL. Whether or not impatient consumers are better off due to
the change in consideration set, depends on whether the seller’s product or a competitor’s
product generates a larger expected consumer surplus.
(3) Inirect effect on impatient consumers (if φ = φH). If αφL increases, αφH must change
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as well to satisfy the confounding constraint. Changing αφH affects the consumer surplus
in the two ways described above, but the effect of αφL on αφH is ambiguous. In particular,
because changing αφL changes p, increasing αφL can increase or decrease
ρ¯(p,c)
ρ¯(p)
which
impacts whether αφH increases or decreases.
The next theorem identifies the design of long-run average optimal information disclosure and promo-
tion policies when (19) is jointly concave under the underlying demand model.
Theorem 4 (Design of Optimal Information Disclosure and Promotion Policies). If W ∗(µ, αφL) is
jointly concave in (αφL , µ), then there exists a joint long-run average optimal platform policy (α, σ)
such that:
1. P(σ(L) = L) = 1.
2. P(σ(H) = H|µ0) is increasing in µ0.
3. α is simple (confounding, static, and promotes a single price).
Theorem 4 establishes that when (19) is jointly concave, characterizing an optimal policy is simple
because WC(µ) is concave on the interior so solving for co(WC) and the optimal signal is straightfor-
ward. Moreover, the resulting optimal policy is a special case of simple platform policies because the
optimal information signal can be characterized by a single parameter and is one of three types: (i)
uninformative (i.e. P(σ(H) = H|µ0) = 0); (ii) partially informative (i.e. P(σ(H) = H|µ0) ∈ (0, 1)); or
(iii) fully informative (i.e. P(σ(H) = H|µ0) = 1). Moreover, after revealing the signal, the promotion
policy deployed by the platform confounds learning in every period throughout the problem horizon,
and therefore the seller never learns from sales observations.
In general, W ∗(µ, αφL) may take various forms and it remains an open problem to characterize sharp
conditions that guarantee joint concavity. However, for a given demand structure one may verify the
joint concavity of W ∗(µ, αφL) analytically, as we demonstrate in Appendix §A.2, or numerically, as we
demonstrate in the next subsection for the logit model.
5.1 Example: Logit Demand
A common discrete choice model that can incorporate both horizontal and vertical differences in
consumer preferences is the logit demand model. In simple form, for a quality parameter q ∈ R,
consumer t’s value for the seller’s product is:
ut = q − p+ ξt.
The value of the consumer t′s outside option is ξOt where ξt and ξ
O
t are indepedent and identically
distributed as type-1 extreme value. We can incorporate a fixed level of competition into this demand
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model through the parameter c. If the market has C competitors where competitor j has fixed quality
qj and price pj , then letting c =
∑C
j=1 exp(q
j − pj), we have:
ρ¯(p, c) =
eq−p
1 + eq−p + c
.
Moreover, by Small and Rosen (1981) the expected consumer surplus functions are:8
W¯0(p) = ln (1 + exp(q − p)) , W¯ (p, c) = ln (1 + exp(q − p) + c) .
The consumer surplus generated by promoting a competitor if the consumer is impatient, W¯C , can be
calculated in the same way. While, numerically, WC(µ, αL) is always jointly concave under the logit
model, we do not establish it analytically. To calculate the functions discussed below, we proceed in
three steps. We first solve for WC(µ) for a grid of beliefs. We then determine the convex hull of these
points. Finally, we characterize an optimal signal using the convex hull.
In analyzing the optimal solution numerically, there are four parameters whose impact we analyze:
the prior, µ0; the (high and low) fraction of impatient consumers, φH , φL; and the competitiveness of
the market, c. We first consider the platform payoff as a function of µ0 and φL, while fixing c and φH .
The results of this analysis are described in Figure 4, where we depict three payoff curves of interest in
each plot. WC(µ0) and co(W
C(µ0)) correspond to the functions defined in the previous section. The
function WF (µ0) represents the expected payoff from a fully informative signal which equals:
WF (µ0) = W
C(0) + (WC(1)−WC(0))µ0. (21)
In Figures 4a and 4b, one may observe that WF (µ0) < co(W
C(µ0)) for all µ0 ∈ (0, 1), corresponding to
the case where a fully informative signal is never optimal. Instead, there is a low region of beliefs where
WC(µ) = co(WC)(µ0) and an uninformative signal is optimal. For the high region of beliefs, however,
a partially informative signal is optimal, which is reflected by the fact that co(WC) is linear along this
interval. On the other hand, in Figures 4c and 4d, we observe the relation WF (µ0) = co(W
C(µ0))
which indicates that a fully informative signal is optimal at all beliefs.
A first takeaway from this analysis is that when there is high variance in the potential value of
promotion (i.e. φH − φL is large) as in Figures 4a and 4b, concealing information is particularly
valuable for the platform. A second takeaway is that concealing information is valuable for low priors.
Confounding the seller under a logit demand model is costly because it requires diverting consumers
from the best product offering. However, this cost is worth the associated decrease in price because the
platform is able to maintain stronger incentives and therefore a lower price in the case that φ = φL.
However, if φ = φH , it is costly for the platform to confound because it is not using the maximum
8We omit an absolute constant term that is irrelevant in considering the effect on changes in consumer surplus through
the platform’s policies.
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Figure 4: Example Value Functions: (q1 = .5, c = .25, φH = .3)
possible incentives to induce a low price from the seller. As the prior µ0 increases, the benefit from
a confounding policy increases, because the optimal price is lower, but the cost of confounding also
increases. In particular, it becomes more likely that φ = φH , so the expected cost of confounding
increases. With small µ0, the benefit from decreasing the seller’s price is greater than the cost of
confounding, but as µ0 increases, there is a shift and the cost of confounding dominates. Therefore,
the platform is better off revealing partial information.
The plots also depict an interesting trade-off in the design the search environments and promotions,
and their impact on consumer welfare. In general, the consumer surplus is not monotone in the fraction
of patient searchers. In this case, one may observe that consumer surplus is not monotone in the Eφ
because there are two opposing effects present. As Eφ increases, the platform is able to exert more
influence on the seller’s pricing decision,so the seller’s price decreases which, all else equal, increases
the consumer surplus. However, increasing Eφ also means that, in expectation, a larger fraction of the
consumers only look at the promoted product, and these consumers have a lower expected consumer
surplus relative to those that search through all of the products.
Figure 5 describes the impact of the quantities φH , φL, and c on the optimal signalling mechanism.
On a grid of values for φL, φH ∈ [0, 1], across two different values of competitiveness, we use a gradient
coloring scheme to indicate the form of the optimal signalling mechanism. As described in Theorem
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Figure 5: Solution Type: Impact of c, φH , and φL. q1 = 0.5.
4 and as can be observed in Figure 4, the optimal signalling mechanism can be described by a single
parameter. Moreover, as a function of the prior µ0, the optimal signalling mechanism is separated into
two regions: (1) reveal no information for low priors; and (2) reveal partial information at higher priors.
In these gradient plots, we let the color of the dot refer to the respective size of these regions. If the
optimal signalling mechanism is fully informative for the specification φL, φH , c, then the corresponding
dot is dark purple. As it becomes optimal to use a fully uninformative signal for a larger interval of
beliefs, the shade of the dot lightens, and a yellow dot indicates that the platform always uses a fully
uninformative signal.
Figure 5 implies, again, that providing partial information is optimal if there is high variance in the
value of the promotion which is represented by a large difference between φH and φL. An additional
takeaway from Figure 5 is that as the competitiveness of the market increases, it is optimal to con-
ceal information for a much larger range of parameters. This result is fairly intuitive because as c
increases the cost of confounding the seller decreases because the consumer surplus from promoting
the competitor’s product is greater.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model of platform interacting with a third-party seller where the platform
cannot directly set prices but can impact prices through promotion decisions, as well as by disclosing
information on the fraction of impatient consumers that consider only the promoted product (the
additional demand that is associated with being promoted). We characterize the maximum long-run
average consumer surplus achievable by a joint information disclosure and promotion policy in this
setting for a broad class of demand models. We introduce the notion of confounding promotions
policies that are designed to prevent the seller from learning the fraction of impatient consumers and
show how they do so. We establish that, when coupled with an optimal information disclosure policy,
the platform can achieve the optimal long-run average consumer surplus through simple policies that
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confound the seller. Notably, these platform policies are long-run optimal even though they incur short-
term costs from diverting impatient consumers from the best product offerings in order to confound
the seller’s learning. Moreover, we establish an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium by showing
that in response to the platform’s optimal simple policy, the seller’s best response at every period and
every history is to use a Bayesian myopic pricing policy.
6.1 Design Implication: Observable Vs. Unobservable Promotions
One concrete policy design consideration that can be analyzed based on our model is whether a platform
benefits by revealing promotion decisions to sellers. In general, we show that it is optimal to not allow
sellers direct access to promotion decisions. For that purpose in Appendix A.1 we consider a setting
where the platform reveals this information. Essentially, the optimal long-run consumer surplus is
again determined by the platform’s optimal confounding promotion policy and corresponding optimal
signalling mechanism, but confounding the seller is often not possible anymore, and when it is possible,
it is often more costly. When confounding the seller is impossible, the maximum long-run average
optimal consumer surplus equals the optimal payoff under a fully revealing signal. For example, under
the logit demand model considered in §5.1, it is impossible to confound a seller that can observe
promotion decisions. Thus, the maximum long-run average optimal consumer surplus equals optimal
payoff under a fully revealing signal, denoted in Figure 4 by WF (µ). In particular, part (a) of Figure
4, depicts a case where it is strictly better for the platform to not reveal promotion decisions under
any prior µ0 ∈ (0, 1); the same outcome is obtained under various demand models and a broad range
of parametric values.
6.2 Extensions and Directions for Future Research
There are several interesting extensions to our model. One may consider the extent to which results are
affected by strategic competition between sellers. While we believe that the key ideas from our work,
and particularly the importance of confounding policies, would remain relevant under such extension,
it is important to note that the way in which competition is modeled will have an important effect
on the result. For example, whether the platform can promote at most one seller, exactly one seller,
or as many sellers as it may choose to, might impact its ability to confound the sellers. Moreover,
how to model each seller’s observations is critical, and it is not a priori clear what is the appropriate
assumption in different settings. In addition, in many cases the platform may in fact be able to
observe relevant information about each consumer that arrives; for example, the platform may be able
to determine its patience type. Understanding how this additional information impacts the platform’s
ability to confound the seller and increase its consumer surplus is an interesting avenue of research.
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A Extensions
A.1 Seller Observes Promotions
In this section, we analyze a setting where the seller observes the promotion decision at each period.
We show that, as in our nominal formulation, the achievable long-run average consumer surplus when
the seller is myopic is determined by the optimal confounding payoff.
Formally, we adjust the model of §2 by denoting the information available to the seller at the beginning
of period t as:
ha1 = 〈s〉 , and hat =
〈
s, (pt′ , at′ , yt′)
t−1
t′=1
〉
, for t > 1.
We denote by {Hat = σ(ht), t = 1, ..., T} the filtration associated with the process {hat }Tt=1, and we
denote the set of possible histories at the beginning of period t as Hat = {L,H} ×
(
P × {0, 1}2)t−1.
The seller’s belief system is defined in terms of these histories.
With access to promotion decisions, the seller can more easily learn the true value of θ, and confounding
the seller requires the platform to use policies that satisfy more stringent conditions. We characterize
these conditions in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Confounding Promotion Policies and Prices). A promotion policy α ∈ A is confound-
ing at price p ∈ P and belief µ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if:
ρ¯0(p) = ρ¯(p, c), and
P(α(p,H, µ) = 1) = P(α(p, L, µ) = 1) = 1.
(22)
If the seller is promoted at price p, then the sales observation is informative about θ unless ρ¯0(p) =
ρ¯(p, c). This case corresponds to a setting where the composition of consumers who purchase from the
seller does not change based on the competition. On the other hand, if the seller is not promoted at
price p, the sales observation is informative about θ unless ρ¯(p, c) = 0. In equilibrium, however, the
seller will not set such a price, so the only possible confounding equilibrium policies are those which
satisfy the criteria in Proposition 1. Note that while there are confounding policies still possible with
observed promotion decisions, it does not necessarily imply that the same policies are optimal in both
settings.
One may use Proposition 1 to define the optimal confounding payoff WC,a(µ) under the histories hat .
To do so, define the set of confounding prices, PC,a(µ) for each belief µ ∈ [0, 1]:
PC,a(µ) := {p ∈ P : ρ0(p) = ρ(p, c), pρ0(p) ≥ (1−Eθφθ)p∗ρ(p∗, c)}.
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Furthermore, if PC,a(µ) is non-empty, define the minimum confounding price, pˆ(µ) = inf PC,a(µ).
With this price, define the optimal confounding payoff as a function of µ:
WC,a(µ) :=
W¯ (pˆ(µ), c) +Eθφθ(W¯ (pˆ(µ))− W¯ (pˆ(µ), c)), if P
C,a(µ) 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
As an analogous result to Theorem 1, we establish the following Theorem.
Theorem 5 (Characterization of Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus (observed promo-
tions)). If the seller observes promotion decisions, then for all µ0 ∈ [0, 1],
lim
T→∞
sup
α∈A,
σ∈Σ
1
T
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) = co(W
C,a(µ0)).
The proof of Theorem 5 is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 1. It only requires adapting Lemma
1 and establishing it under the new information setting.
When promotion decisions are observed y the seller, in many demand models (including, e.g., logit),
it is impossible to confound the seller as PC,a(µ) = ∅ for all µ ∈ (0, 1); this is in constrast with our
basic formulation where the set of confounding policies is always non-empty. When PC,a(µ) = ∅, one
may establish that it is without loss of long-run average optimality to restrict the platform to a fully
revealing signal.
Corollary 1 (Optimality of a Fully Revealing Signal). If PC,a(µ) = ∅ for all µ ∈ (0, 1), then
lim
T→∞
sup
α∈A,
σ∈Σ
1
T
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) = sup
α∈A
Wα,σ
F ,pi∗
1 (µ0).
If the platform cannot confound the seller under any promotion decision, then the seller cam quickly
learn the true value of promotion φθ. In these cases, based on Corollary 1, it is immediate to observe
that the platform can use a fully revealing signal and maintain long-run average optimality.
The precise impact of sharing the observation information with the seller depends on the demand
model, but in general, observing the decision decreases the consumer welfare (which we establish in
the following Corollary) but does not affect the seller’s expected revenue.
Corollary 2 (Access to Promotion Decisions Decreases Consumer Surplus). For all µ ∈ [0, 1],
WC(µ) ≥WC,a(µ). (23)
Consumer surplus decreases simply because the set of policies that confound the seller is smaller. The
intuition for why the platform can be worse off by not being able to confound the seller is described
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in §3.1. The seller, on the other hand, cannot increase its revenue even with the richer information
structure because the optimal platform strategy reacts to the seller’s learning as described in §4.3. In
many cases the inequality in Corollary 2 is strict. As mentioned above, PC,a(µ) = ∅ for all µ in the
logit demand case, so co(WC,a(µ)) = WF (µ), which is defined in (21), is the optimal payoff from a
fully revealing signal (σF ). Thus, Figures 4a and 4b depict settings in which allowing the seller to
observe the promotion decision leads to a strictly lower consumer surplus for µ ∈ (0, 1). Figures 4c and
4d, on the other hand, are examples of settings where the long-run average optimal consumer surplus
is the same across the two models.
A.2 Examples of Simple Demand Models
Our formulation allows for a broad class of discrete choice models including logit, mixed logit, and
probit, among others. We next provide two simple examples of demand models that are covered by
our formulation and we will revisit later on. In the following section, we characterize optimal policies
analytically for these examples.
A.2.1 Horizontal Differentiation on a Line
Consider a model of demand where products are differentiated horizontally along a line. The simplest
case involves the seller located at 0, a non-strategic competitor located at 1, and consumers with types
distributed uniformly along the interval (0, 1) while allowing for point masses at {0, 1} denoted by f0
and f1, respectively. A type ω ∈ [0, 1] consumer has value q − p − ω for the seller’s product, value
c− (1− ω) for the competitor’s product, and an outside option value of 0. The seller’s feasible set of
prices is P = [0, q]. Given the consideration set determined by their patience type and the platform’s
promotion decision, the consumer selects the option with the greatest value. Thus the seller’s demand
functions are, for p ∈ P :
ρ¯0(p) = (1− f0 − f1)(q − p) + f01{q − p ≥ 0}
ρ¯(p, c) =
(1− f0 − f1)(q − p) + f01{q − p ≥ 0}, if q − p < 1− c,(1− f0 − f1) ( q−p+1−c2 )+ f01{q − p ≥ c− 1}, otherwise
where ρ¯0(p) indicates the probability of purchase by an impatient consumer when the seller is promoted
and ρ¯(p, c) indicates the probability of purchase by a patient consumer. The corresponding consumer
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surplus functions are:
W¯ (p, c) =
∫ 1
0
max{q − p− ω, c− (1− ω)}dF (ω)
W¯0(p) = (q − p)f0 + (q − p)
2
2
(1− f0 − f1)
W¯c = f1c+
c2
2
(1− f0 − f1)
where W¯ (p, c) corresponds to the expected consumer surplus for patient consumers, and W¯0(p) and
W¯c are the expected consumer surplus for impatient consumers when the seller is promoted and not
promoted, respectively.
A.2.2 Vertical Differentiation
Consider a model of demand where consumers only consider purchasing from the product in their
consideration set that generates the maximum consumer surplus. Speficially, consider two products
where consumer t’s value for the seller’s product is q−p−ωt and her value for the competitor’s product
is c− ωt where ωt is independent and distributed according to F . Therefore, each consumer will only
purchase (with positive probability) the product that generates more value for consumers. Additionally,
each consumer has an outside option value equal to 0. For simplicity, we assume F = U [0, 1] so that
the demand functions are:
ρ¯0(p) = (q − p)+
ρ¯(p, c) = (q − p)1{q − p ≥ c}.
The corresponding consumer surplus functions are:
W¯ (p, c) =
1
2
max{(q − p)2, c2},
W¯0(p) =
1
2
(q − p)2,
W¯c =
1
2
c2.
A.3 Analysis of Simple Demand Models
We demonstrate the identification of long-run average optimal joint information disclosure and pro-
motion policies for the demand models advanced in the previous section.
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A.3.1 Horizontal Differentiation on a Line
Consider the model of A.2.1. One may show that if q + c ≤ 1 then W ∗(µ, αφL) is jointly concave so
the results of Theorem 4 apply. This condition implies that the ‘travel’ cost relative to the quality of
the seller and competitor is high, so the seller and competitor do not compete for consumers.
For simplicity we focus here on the case where f0 = f1 = 0 but our approach can be applied in other
cases as well. Recall from the previous section that for every µ, the optimal simple promotion policy is
completely characterized by a price p(µ) and the promotion probabilities at that price αφL(µ), αφH (µ).
Since the objective is concave, we can use first order conditions to solve for the optimal αφL . The
objective reaches its maximum at:9
α¯L(µ) :=
(1− φL + (φH − φL)µ)
2φL
( (
2c2 − q2)
2c
√
c2 − q2 − 1
)
.
For µ < 1, the optimal platform policy is:
αφL(µ) =
1, if q ≥ cmin{α¯L(µ)+, 1}, otherwise αφH (µ) = 1− (1− αφL)
(
φL
φH
)
(24)
p(µ) =
q
2
(
1−
√
φLαφL(µ) + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαφL(µ)
)
For µ = 1, the optimal platform policy is:
αφH (1) =
1, if q ≥ cmin{α¯+H , 1}, otherwise
p(1) =
q
2
(
1−
√
φHαφH (1)
1− φH + φHαφH (1)
)
where αφL(1) does not affect the solution and we define
α¯H :=
(1− φH)
2φH
( (
2c2 − q2)
2c
√
c2 − q2 − 1
)
.
Having characterized the optimal simple promotion policy and the corresponding payoff WC(µ), it
remains to characterize the optimal signal and co(WC(µ)). The standard procedure is outlined in
the previous section but we will elaborate on the case where αφL(µ) = 1 for all µ, which occurs
when q is sufficiently high relative to c. In this case, the platform optimal simple promotion policy
also has αφH (µ) = 1. Because the seller’s quality is sufficiently high relative to the competitor, the
9Note that there are two local maxima but α¯L defines the only one that may be feasible.
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platform seeks to maximize the seller’s incentive to lower their price and ‘rewards’ the seller with more
consumer traffic through the promotion. In this case, we can also show that WC(µ) = co(WC(µ)),
which implies that a fully uninformative signal is optimal. We observe this in this demand model
because ρ0(p) = ρc(p) for all p without competition, so the platform does not incur a cost from
confounding the seller as it does not need to divert consumers to confound learning.
However, we note that there are cases where q − p(µ) < c and αφL(µ) = 1, which implies that the
platform is diverting all consumers from the superior product because it is worth doing so to incentivize
the seller to post a low price.
A.3.2 Vertical Differentiation
With the model of vertical differentiation, one may show that W ∗(µ, αφL) is again jointly concave in
µ and αφL . Thus, the analysis follows in a similar manner to the model of horizontal differentiation.
If q < c, one may show that the platform would never promote and the seller would make no sales.
Thus, we focus on the case where q > c. Moreover, for simplicity of the algebra, we consider where
q
2 > c so that the seller’s product generates a greater expected consumer surplus than the competitor’s
even at the seller’s monopoly price. Thus, in the current period, the consumer surplus is maximized
by promoting the seller at any price that they would set. Again, as a function of µ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal
simple promotion policy is characterized by a price p(µ) and promotion probabilities at that price
αφL(µ), αφH (µ):
αφL(µ) = αφH (µ) = 1
p(µ) =
q
2
(
1−
√
φL + µ(φH − φL)
)
.
The corresponding maximum consumer surplus from a confounding policy is:
WC(µ) =
q2
4
(
1 +
√
φL + µ(φH − φL)
)2
(25)
WC(µ) is concave in µ and in fact we can establish that WC(µ) = co(WC(µ)). Therefore, the optimal
signal is fully uninformative: σ(H) = L w.p. 1. Since αφL = αφH = 1, there is no difference in
the probability that a consumer purchases from the seller whether he is promoted or not. Thus, the
platform does not need to divert consumers away from the seller in order to prevent learning.
Note that in this demand model, there is no tradeoff for the platform between providing incentives
to the seller to lower the price and promoting the superior seller. The vertical nature of product
differentiation allows the seller to always promote the superior seller.
35
B Proofs
Throughout all of the proofs, we will refer to the patience type of customer t explicitly using ψt.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For the sake of clarity, several intermediate reuslts are proven in sections following the main proof.
Recall that pi∗ is defined in (5) as the Bayesian myopic pricing policy that maximizes the consumer
welfare.
B.1.1 Proof of Main Results
Fix  > 0. We will show there exists T¯ such that for T > T¯ and all α ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ and µ0 ∈ [0, 1]:
1
T
Wα,σ,pi
∗
T (µ0) < W
C(µ0) + .
Fix platform strategies α ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ. Fix T ≥ 1 and for each period t =, 1..., T , define the set of
beliefs, Mαt() ⊂ [0, 1] where which the expected consumer surplus is at least  more than co(WC):
Mα() := {µ ∈ [0, 1] : Eat,ψ,φ (W (pt, at, ψt, c)|αt, µ) > WC(µ) + }.
We split the payoff comparison into two subsets of periods and let EZ indicate expectation with respect
to (p,a,ψ,y, φ):
EZ
(
T∑
t=1
W (pt, at, ψt, c)1{µt ∈Mαt(/2)}+W (pt, at, ψt, c)1{µt 6∈Mαt(/2)}
)
− Tco(WC)(µ0)
(a)
≤E
(
T∑
t=1
W (pt, at, ψt, c)1{µt ∈Mαt(/2)}+W (pt, at, ψt, c)1{µt 6∈Mα1(/2)} − co(WC)(µt)
)
≤
T∑
t=1
E
(
(W (pt, at, ψt, c)− co(WC)(µt))1{µt ∈Mαt(/2)}
)
+

2
T∑
t=1
E1{µt 6∈Mαt(/2)}
(26)
(a) co(WC) is concave by construction and Eµt = µ0,∀t because Bayesian beliefs are a martingale.
It follows by Jensen’s inequality that Eco(WC(µt)) ≤ co(WC(Eµt)) = co(WC(µ0)).
The second term is clearly less than T2 for all T . It remains to show that there exists a T¯ such that
for all T > T¯ :
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
(
(W (pt, at, ψt, c)− co(WC)(µt))1{µt ∈Mα(/2)}
) ≤ 
2
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We do so through the following lemmas. First, there exists a δ > 0 such that if µ ∈Mαt(), then the
probability of a sale conditional on φ = φH differs from the probability of a sale conditional on φ = φL
by at least δ.
Lemma 1. Fix  > 0. There exists δ > 0 such that for all α ∈ A, if µ ∈Mαt(), then:
|φHα(pt, H, µ)ρ¯0(pt) + (1− φH)ρ¯(pt, c)− φLα(pt, L, µ)ρ¯0(pt) + (1− φL)ρ¯(pt, c)| > δ.
Next we show that beliefs to the truth converge fast (in the number of periods that µt ∈ Mαt())
which is closely related to Harrison et al. (2012) Lemma A.1. Define
tn = min
{
t :
t∑
t′=1
1{µt′ ∈Mαt′ ()} ≥ n
}
, n(t) =
t∑
t′=1
1{µt′ ∈Mαt′ ()}
where tn = T + 1 if n >
∑T
t′=1 1{µt′ ∈Mαt′ ()} and we define µT+1 = 0.
Lemma 2. Fix µ0 ∈ [0, 1]. There exist constants χ, ψ > 0 such that:
E(µtn |φ = φL) ≤ χ exp(−ψn) E(1− µtn |φ = φH) ≤ χ exp(−ψn), ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T.
Finally, we show that the value of the optimal confounding payoff does not change too fast as a function
of µ. Define Wmax(µ1) as the maximum consumer surplus achievable by any promotion policy when
T = 1 and the seller has belief µ1.
Wmax(µ1) := max
α∈A
1
T
E (W (p1, a1, c)|α, pi∗, µ1) . (27)
Lemma 3. There exists C¯ ∈ R, such that:
(
co(Wmax)(µ)− co(WC)(µ)) < C¯µ, and (co(Wmax)(µ)− co(WC)(µ)) < C¯(1− µ).
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1T
T∑
n=1
EZ
(
(W (pt, at, ψt, c)− co(WC)(µtn))
∣∣φ = φL) ≤ 1
T
T∑
n=1
EZ
(
co(Wmax)(µtn)− co(WC)(µtn)
∣∣φ = φL)
≤ 1
T
T∑
n=1
EZ
(
C¯µtn
∣∣φ = φL) , [by Lemma 3]
≤ C¯ 1
T
T∑
n=1
χ exp(−ψn) [by Lemma 1]
≤ C¯ 1
T
∞∑
n=1
χ exp(−ψn)
= C¯
χ
T
1
eψ − 1
The result follows analagously with φ = φH so in either case, by the above analysis, there exists a T¯
such that for any policy α ∈ (AP )T , σ ∈ Σ :
C¯
χ
T¯
1
eψ − 1 <

2
.
Letting → 0, this completes the proof in one direction as we have:
lim
T→∞
sup
α∈A,σ∈S
1
T
Wα,Σ,pi
∗
(µ0, T ) ≤ co(WC(µ0)).
By Theorem 3, the reverse direction holds.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the Lemma: Fix  > 0. There exists δ > 0 such that for all α ∈ A, if µ ∈Mαt(), then:
|φHα(pt, H, µ)ρ¯0(pt) + (1− φH)ρ¯(pt, c)− φLα(pt, L, µ)ρ¯0(pt) + (1− φL)ρ¯(pt, c)| > δ.
Proof. Throughout this proof, we assume that T = 1 (e.g. when we refer to A) as we are considering
the promotion policy for a single period. By Theorem 2 it is without loss to consider α ∈ AP . Given
this simplification, we simplify notation by letting, for φ ∈ {φL, φH}, αφ = P(α(p, φ, µ) = 1) where µ
will be left implicit and p is known to be the single price where αφ may be greater than 0.
Define the following relaxed maximization problem where the policy α need only be δ confounding.
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For µ ∈ (0, 1), δ ≥ 0, define:
WC(µ, δ) := max
αH ,αL∈[0,1],
p∈P
Eφ
(
φαφW¯0(p) + (1− φαφ)W¯C + (1− φφ)W¯ (p, c)|µ
)
s.t. pρ0(p)(φLαL(1− µ) + φHαHµ) + pρ(p, c)(1− φL − µ(φH − φL)) ≥
p∗ρ(p∗, c)(1− φL − µ(φH − φL))
|φHαH ρ¯(pt, 0) + (1− φH)ρ¯(pt, c)− φLαLρ¯(pt, 0)− (1− φL)ρ¯(pt, c)| ≤ δ.
(28)
The first constraint requires that the pricing policy be myopically optimal given αL, αH and the fact
that α is simple. Moreover, letting p be determined in the optimization problem ensures that it is the
price that maximizes consumer welfare.
To prove the statement of the Lemma, we now show that there exists δ¯ such that for all µ if δ < δ¯,
then:
WC(µ, δ)−WC(µ, 0) < .
By proving this statement, it implies that if WC(µ, δ)−WC(µ, 0) > , the probability of a sale must
be separated by at least δ¯. We prove this through three points:
1. Let X(µ, δ) be the arg max of (28). By Berge Theorem of the Maximum, (see, e.g. Walker
(1979)) X(µ, δ) is upper hemi-continuous under two conditions we now prove. Proof : We need
two conditions which we now prove:
• The objective of (28) is continuous in αH , αL, p, δ, µ.
Proof. It is linear in µ, αL, and αH and constant in δ. We have continuity in p by Assump-
tion 1.
• The feasible set F (δ) ⊂ [0, 1]2 × P is continuous (upper and lower) in δ.
Lower Hemicontinuity. Fix δ0 ≥ 0 and open set V ⊂ [0, 1]2 × P . If V ∩ F (δ0), then we
must show: there exists  > 0 such that if δ0 −  < δ < δ0 + , then F (δ) ∩ V 6= ∅. Proof.
F (δ) is weakly increasing so the statement trivially holds for δ0 ≤ δ < δ0 + . Thus, we
need to show that there exists  where for any δ0 −  < δ < δ0, we have F (δ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Let (αL, αH , p) ∈ F (δ0) ∩ V . It is clear that there exists the required  > 0 unless there is
equality in the second constraint at this point (αL, αH , p).
|φHαH ρ¯(pt, 0) + (1− φH)ρ¯(pt, c)− φLαLρ¯(pt, 0) + (1− φL)ρ¯(pt, c)| = δ0
|αHφH − αLφL| = δ0 + (φH − φL)ρ¯(pt, c)
ρ¯(pt, 0)
The right hand side of the last equation is positive by definition and well defined because
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we must have: (ρ¯(pt, 0) > 0). If not, then ρ¯(pt, c) = 0 beacuse ρ¯ is decreasing in c by
Assumption 1 and therefore the first equation cannot hold because the left hand side would
equal 0. Since this cannot happen, the right hand side is positive and well-defined and so is
the left hand side. Using this, we will now define a point (α˜L, α˜H , p) ∈ F (δ)∩ V for δ < δ0.
Select ξ > 0 so that (min{αL+ξ, 1}, (αH−ξ)+, p) ∈ V and ((αL−ξ)+,min{αH+ξ, 1}, p) ∈ V .
Note this is possible because V is an open set by assumption.
If (αHφH − αLφL) > 0, then define α˜H = (αH − ξ)+ and α˜L = min{αL + ξ, 1}. At least
one of these points will change because −φL < 0 so we would otherwise contradict our
assumption that (αHφH − αLφL) > 0. Note that if (α˜HφH − α˜LφL) < 0 then select ξ
smaller so this does not happen.
If (αHφH−αLφL) < 0, then define α˜L = (αL−ξ)+ or α˜H = min{αH+ξ, 1} . At least one of
these points will change because φH > 0 so we would otherwise contradict our assumption
that (αHφH − αLφL) < 0. Note that if (α˜HφH − α˜LφL) > 0 then select ξ smaller so this
does not happen.
In either case, at this new point we have: |P(y = 1|φ = φH , α˜, p)−P(y = 1|φ = φL, α˜, p)| <
δ0. Thus, set
 = |P(y = 1|φ = φH , α˜, p)−P(y = 1|φ = φL, α˜, p)|
and because F (δ) is increasing, the result holds for δ > δ0 − .
Proof of Upper Hemicontinuity. Fix δ0 ≥ 0 and open set V ⊂ [0, 1]2×P . If F (δ0) ⊂ V,
then we must show: there exists  > 0 such that for δ0 −  < δ < δ0 + ⇒ F (δ) ⊂ V .
Proof. Fix open set V such that F (δ0) ⊂ V . For any  > 0, we have that F (δ0 − ) ⊂
F (δ0) ⊂ V . Thus, consider n ↓ 0. We want to show that there exists N¯ such that for
N > N¯ , F (δ0 + ) ⊂ V . This follows because F (δ0 + n) is closed for each n and it
converges to F (δ0).
2. By Lipschitz continuity of the objective function, there exists C¯ such that if ||(p, αL, αH) −
(p′, α′L, α
′
H)|| < ζ, then∣∣∣∣Eφ (φαφW¯0(p) + (1− φαφ)W¯C + (1− φφ)W¯0(p, c)|µ)
−Eφ
(
φα′phiW¯0(p
′) + (1− φα′φ)W¯C + (1− φ)W¯ (p′, c)|µ
) ∣∣∣∣ < C¯ζ.
3. Fixing ζ = C¯ ,by the upper hemi-continuity of X
∗, there exists δ¯ such that for all δ < δ¯, there
exists x∗(δ) ∈ X∗(δ), x∗(0) ∈ X∗(0) such that ||x∗(δ)− x∗(0)|| < C¯ .
Combining items 2 and 3, we have for δ < δ¯:
WC(µ, δ)−WC(µ, 0) < barC · C¯

= .
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This completes the proof of the Lemma.
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall the Lemma. Fix µ0 ∈ [0, 1]. There exist constants χ, ψ > 0 such that:
E(µtn |φ = φL) ≤ χ exp(−ψn) E(1− µtn |φ = φH) ≤ χ exp(−ψn), ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T.
Fix δ > 0. Consider the first inequality (i.e. conditioned on φ = φL). The second follows nearly
verbatim. Let EL indicate that we are taking expectation conditional on φ = φL. By Harrison et al.
(2012) proof of Lemma A.1, we have that:
E
L(µtn) = E
L
 1
1 +
(
1−µ0
µ0
)
exp(Ltn)

where
Ltn =
tn∑
t′=1
(yt′ − ρLt ) log
(
ρLt′(1− ρHt′ )
ρHt′ (1− ρLt′
)
+
tn∑
t′=1
(1− ρLt′) log
(
1− ρLt′
1− ρHt′
)
+ ρLt′ log
(
1− ρLt′
1− ρHt′
)
From Harrison Lemma A.2 and its proof which shows x log(xy ) + (1− x) log 1−x1−y ≥ 0, we have that:
tn∑
t′=1
(1− ρLt′) log
(
1− ρLt′
1− ρHt′
)
+ ρLt′ log
(
1− ρLt′
1− ρHt′
)
≥ 2
n∑
t′=1
δ2
Let
Mt :=
tn∑
t′=1
(yt′ − ρLt ) log
(
ρLt′(1− ρHt′ )
ρHt′ (1− ρLt′
)
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Fix ξ > 0.
E
L
Z
(
1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(Ltn)
)
= ELZ
(
1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(Mtn + 2nδ
2)
)
a≤ ELZ
(
1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(Mtn + 2nδ
2)
; |Mtn | < ξtn
)
E
L
Z
(
1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(Mtn + 2nδ
2)
; |Mtn | ≥ ξtn
)
(b)
≤ ELZ
(
1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(−ξtn + 2nδ2)
; |Mtn | < ξtn
)
+P(|Mtn | ≥ ξtn|φ = φL)
(c)
≤ 1
1 + 1−µ0µ0 exp(−ξtn + 2nδ2)
+
(
2γ
ξ2
)
e−
ξ2
γ n
(d)
≤ µ0
1− µ0 exp(ξtn − 2nδ
2) +
(
2γ
ξ2
)
e−
ξ2
γ n
(e)
≤ χe−ψn
(a) Uses a lower bound on Lt
(b) By conditioning on Mt and the fraction in the expectation is less than 1.
(c) By Harrison Lemma A.3, Mt is a martingale and we can use the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality to
show that tail probabilities are bounded. Namely, there exists γ > 0 such that for all t
P(|Mt| ≥ ξt|φ = φL) ≤ 2 exp
(−ξ2t
2γ
)
Because the stopping time could be dependent on the value of Mt but tn ≥ n, we integrate out
the probability for all t ≥ n.
P(|Mtn | ≥ ξtn|φ = φL) ≤
∞∑
t=n
P(|Mt| ≥ ξt|φ = φL) ≤
(
2γ
ξ2
)
e−
ξ2
γ n
(d) Algebra.
(e) Set χ = 2 max
{
µ0
1−µ0 ,
2γ
ξ2
}
and ψ = δ2 min
{
1, δ
2
2γ
}
.
Finally, to put this in terms of µ0. We must take expectation over the signal s. From Theorem 2,
it is without loss of optimality to consider σ ∈ ΣS . Thus µ1 can take two values which we denote:
µ = µ1 (〈L〉) ≤ µ0 ≤ µ1 (〈H〉) = µ which, using Bayes’ rule and algebra, implies that:
P(s = L|L) = (1− µ)(µ− µ)
(1− µ)(µ− µ) P(s = L|H) =
µ(µ− µ)
µ(µ− µ)
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Note that:
χ = 2 max
{
µ1
1− µ1 ,
2γ
ξ2
}
,
and ψ is independent of µ. Thus, taking expectation over the signal s:
Es (µtn |φ = φL) = P(s = H|φ = φL)E (µtn |φ = φL, µ1 = µ) +P(s = L|φ = φL)E
(
µtn |φ = φL, µ1 = µ
)
≤ P(s = H|φ = φL)2 max
{
µ
1− µ,
2γ
ξ2
}
e−ξn +P(s = L|φ = φL)2 max
{
µ
1− µ,
2γ
ξ2
}
e−ξn
(a)
=

(
µ0
1−µ0
)
e−ξn, if
µ
1−µ >
2γ
ξ2(
µ0(µ−(1−µ)
(
2γ
ξ2
)
)−µ(µ−(1−µ1)
(
2γ
ξ2
)
)
(1−µ0)(µ−µ)
)
, if
µ
1−µ <
2γ
ξ2 <
µ
1−µ
2γ
ξ2 e
−ξn, if µ1−µ <
2γ
ξ2
(a) First line follows by algebra. In any of these cases, these constants are bounded regardless of the
signal. This completes the proof for φ = φL. The same proof holds when φ = φH , though (ψ, χ) may
be different, so simply take the maximum of them and the result holds.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall the Lemma:
There exists C¯ ∈ R, such that:
(
co(Wmax)(µ)− co(WC)(µ)) < C¯µ, and (co(Wmax)(µ)− co(WC)(µ)) < C¯(1− µ).
Proof. Wmax(µ) equals W (µ, δ) for large enough δ, for example, δ = 1 as this constraint imposes no
restrictions on the solutions. Therefore, this result follows the same lines as Lemma 1 as it simply
requires showing that X(µ, δ) is continuous in µ which means that WC(µ) and Wmax(µ) inherit the
Lipschitz continuity of the welfare functions. To prove X(µ, δ) is upper-hemicontinuous only requires
showing that F (µ, δ) is continuous in µ which is straightforward as only the first constraint has an
effect and the demand functions are continuous.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
For convenience, we will consider adjustments to the two parts of the strategy separately.
Promotion Policy
Fix α ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ. Fix pi∗ = {pi∗t }Tt=1 ∈ Π∗(α) as a Bayesian myopic pricing policy which satisfies (5).
We construct a pricing policy that is deterministic at every history. Beginning in period T , for every
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µ ∈ [0, 1] let p∗T (µ) ∈ P be a price in the support of pi∗T (µ). Note that this implies we are replacing
piT (µ) = p
∗
T (µ) w.p. 1. Note that this altered pricing policy is myopically optimal at every period and
pi′ satisfies (5) as every price in the support of pi∗ must have satisfied both. Working backwards, we
can do the same in every period t = T − 1, ..., 1 and create a pricing policy pi′ that is deterministic at
every history. Using these prices, define:
α′t(p, φ, µ) =
αt(p, φ, µ), if p = p
∗
t (µ)
0, otherwise
(29)
Letting α = {α′t}Tt=1, we have α ∈ AP and it generates the same consumer surplus.
Signaling Mechanism
Fix α ∈ A and σ ∈ Σ. The signaling mechanism σ induces a probability distribution over posteriors
µ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Conditioned on µ1, the platform’s expected value is independent of the realized signal
s. Thus, given α, we can write the expected consumer surplus at the beginning of the first period in
terms of the posterior µ1: W
α,pi(µ1) = E
(∑T
t=1W (pt, at, ψt, c)|α, pi, µ1
)
.
If Wα,pi(µ0) ≥ Es (Wα,pi(µ1)|σ), then we have the result by defining an uninformative simple signal.
Namely, let S = {φL, φH} and σ′(φ) = L w.p. 1, for φ ∈ {φL, φH}.
Otherwise, since EsW
α,pi(µ1) is a convex combination of points in the set [0, 1]×R and (µ0,Wα,pi(µ0))
is in the interior of the convex hull, there exist points 0 ≤ µ′ < µ0 < µ′′ ≤ where Wα,pi(µ′) +
Wα,pi(µ′′)−Wα,pi(µ′)
µ′′−µ′ ≥Wα,pi(µ0).
Letting S = {φL, φH} and
σ′(φL) =
φL, w.p.
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
H, w.p. 1−
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
and
σ′(φH) =
φL, w.p.
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
φH , w.p. 1−
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
completes the result.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We prove the result in several steps.
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1. We first show that there exists a simple promotion policy that generates consumer surplus
WC(µ1).
2. We then show than an optimal simple signal exists.
3. We show that the Bayesian myopic policy is a best response to the optimal simple policy. Ap-
pealing to Theorem 1, we have that the platform’s policy is -optimal which completes the proof.
Existence of Optimal Simple Promotion Policy. For a given µ1 ∈ [0, 1), consider the optimization
problem (12). Using Theorem 2, it is without loss of optimality to consider the set of policies AS .
Therefore, (12) can be written as for µ ∈ (0, 1):
WC(µ) := max
αφH ,αφL∈[0,1],
p∈P
E
(
φαφW¯0(p) + (1− φαφ)W¯C + (1− φ)W¯ (p, c)|µ
)
s.t. (µφHαφH + (1− µ)φLαφL)pρ¯(p, 0) + pρ¯(p, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
≥ p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
φHαφH ρ¯(pt, 0) + (1− φH)ρ¯(pt, c) = φLαφL ρ¯(pt, 0) + (1− φL)ρ¯(pt, c).
(30)
where p is the probability of promotion and αφ¯ is the probability of promotion conditional on φ = φ¯
for φ¯ ∈ {φL, φH}.
If µ ∈ {0, 1}, the second constraint need not hold. If µ = 1, the same argument follows, but we define p¯
in terms of αφH and αφL can be any feasible point without affecting the expected value. The opposite
holds if µ = 0, but in either case the argument below holds with these minor adjustments.
Assume that µ ∈ (0, 1). By the second constraint:
αφH =
(
(φH − φL)
φH
)(
ρ¯(pt, c)
ρ¯(pt, 0)
)
+ αφL
(
φL
φH
)
We can substitute in for αφH and eliminate the second constraint because:
αφL ∈ [0, 1]⇒
(
(φH − φL)
φH
)(
ρ¯(pt, c)
ρ¯(pt, 0)
)
+ αφL
(
φL
φH
)
∈ [0, 1]
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Substitute this in to the first constraint:(
µ
(
((φH − φL))
(
ρ¯(pt, c)
ρ¯(pt, 0)
)
+ αφLφL
)
+ (1− µ)φLαφL
)
pρ¯(p, 0)
≥ (p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)− pρ¯(p, c)) (1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
⇔
(
µ(φH − φL)
(
ρ¯(pt, c)
ρ¯(pt, 0)
)
+ φLαφL
)
pρ¯(p, 0)
≥ (p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)− pρ¯(p, c)) (1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
⇔µ(φH − φL) (pρ¯(p, c)) + φLαφLpρ¯(p, 0)
≥ (p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)− pρ¯(p, c)) (1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
⇔(1− φL)pρ¯(p, c) + φLαφLpρ¯(p, 0)
≥ p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)
(31)
For fixed αφL , the objective is decreasing in p, so the optimal p is the smallest p that satisfies (31).
Moreover, the left hand side is strictly concave in p by Assumption 1 and greater than the right hand
side at p∗, which we defined as:
p∗ = arg max
p∈P
pρ¯(p, c).
Thus, the optimal p in terms of αφL is the unique p less than p
∗ such that the constraint holds with
equality. We denote this p as p(αφL) and (30) is equivalent to:
WC(µ) := max
αφL∈[0,1]
Eφ
(
φαφW¯0(p(αφL)) + (1− φαφ)W¯C + (1− φ)W¯ (p(αφL), c)|µ
)
(32)
Defining:
f(αφL , p) = (1− φL)pρ¯(p, c) + φLαφLpρ¯(p, 0)− p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ), (33)
then we have that f(αφL , p(αφL)) = 0,∀αφL ∈ [0, 1]. p(αφL) is strictly decreasing and it is continuous
because it is the inverse of a strictly decreasing, continuous function αφL(p):
αφL(p) =
p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ)− (1− φL)pρ¯(p, c)
φLpρ¯(p, 0)
Since p(αφL) is continuous, the objective of (32) is continuous, so by the Extreme Value Theorem (as
[0, 1] is compact), a maximizer exists. Let αC correspond to the simple promotion policy where this
optimizer (α) is repeated T times. By construction the beliefs, price, and expected welfare are static
in each period. Thus, Wα,pi(µ1) = W
C(µ1).
Existence of Optimal, Simple Signal. WC(µ1) is linear in µ and therefore continuous, so an
optimal signal σ ∈ Σ exists (see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) Corrollary 1 and discussion). Then,
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by Theorem 2, an optimal simple signal exists and by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) Corrollary 2,
the optimal signal at prior µ0 generates value co(W
C(µ)) in each period.
-Equilibrium and pi∗ as Best Response. Let α∗ correspond to the optimal simple policy for all
µ1 ∈ [0, 1]. By the above derivation of the optimal simple α, at belief µ, the seller’s expected payoff
at the myopically optimal price is p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µ) (see, (31)).
We induct backwards (through time periods) to show that the seller’s optimal policy is pi∗. In period
T , as a function of the seller’s belief µT , the seller’s maximum expected revenue is:
VT (µT ) = p
∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µT ).
Induction Hypothesis: Given a period t, assume:
Vt+1(µt+1) = (T − t)p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µt+1).
Consider period t. The seller’s expected continuation payoff is indepedent of the seller’s posted price:
because Vt+1(µt+1) is linear in µt+1 and the seller’s beliefs are Bayesian, one has
EytVt+1(µt+1) = Vt+1(Eytµt+1) = Vt+1(µt).
Since the expected continuation value is independent of the price set, the seller’s optimal price is the
one that maximizes the immediate payoff. Thus, pi∗ is optimal, and
Vt(µt) = p
∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µt) + Vt+1(µt)
= (T − t+ 1)p∗ρ¯(p∗, c)(1− φL − (φH − φL)µt).
which completes the proof that pi∗ is the optimal best response.
Finally, by Theorem 1, the optimal long run payoff is co(WC(µ0)) which is achieved by α
∗, σ and
therefore the platform’s strategy is approximately-optimal as defined in (13).
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
From the proof of Theorem 3, the platform’s optimization problem is for µ ∈ [0, 1):
WC(µ) := max
αL∈[0,1]
Eφ
(
φαφW¯0(p(αL)) + (1− φαφ)W¯C + (1− φ)W¯ (p(αL), c)|µ
)
(34)
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Plugging in for αH through the confounding condition, the objective equals:
W ∗(αL, µ) := µ
(
(φH − φL)ρ
B(p¯(αL))
ρA(p¯(αL))
)
(wA(p¯(αL))− λA) + φLαL(wA(p¯(αL))− λA)
+(1− φL − µ(φH − φL))wB(p¯(αL)).
If this is jointly concave in (µ, αL), then by standard results on the partial maximization of a concave
function, WC(µ) is concave in µ on the set [0, 1). See, e.g. Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) at §3.2.5.
To prove that there exists an optimal signal σ ∈ ΣS whereP(σ(L) = L), we first note that limµ→1WC(µ) ≤
WC(1) because the feasibility set of the confounding optimization problem (12) is increasing in µ and
the objective is continuous in µ.
Since limµ→1WC(µ) ≤WC(1) and WC(µ) is concave, there exists µ˜ such that:
co(WC(µ)) =
W
C(µ), if µ ≤ µ˜
WC(µ˜) + W
C(1)−WC(µ˜)
1−µ˜ (µ− µ˜), if µ > µ˜
From Theorem 2, there exists an optimal signal with the form:
σ′(L) =
L, w.p.
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
H, w.p. 1−
(
1−µ′
1−µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
and
σ′(H) =
L, w.p.
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
H, w.p. 1−
(
µ′
µ0
)(
µ′′−µ0
µ′′−µ′
)
where µ′ = sup{µ ≤ µ0 : co(WC(µ)) = WC(µ)} and µ′ = inf{µ ≥ µ0 : co(WC(µ)) = WC(µ)}.
If µ ≤ µ˜, then µ′ = µ′′ = µ0. If µ > µ˜, then based on the characterization of WC(µ) above, one has
that µ′ = µ˜ and µ′′ = 1. In either case, we have that σ′(L) = L w.p. 1.
B.5 Analysis of Horizontal and Vertical Models
B.5.1 Horizontal Differentiation on a Line
Assume a uniform distribution with no masses in the demand distribution; the proof with masses
follows in the same way.
For simplicity, we assume in this analysis that q+c ≤ 1. Note that because we consider α ∈ αS , only one
price is promoted. The seller’s optimal price that is not promoted solves: maxp pρ(p, c) = p(q−p) = q
2
4 .
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Thus, the minimum myopically optimal price is the minimum price that solves:
(1− φL + φLαL)p(q − p) ≥ q
2
4
(1− φL − µ(φH − φL))
⇒ p¯(µ, α) = q
2
(
1−
√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)
The problem of maximizing consumer surplus becomes (where p = p¯(µ, α) to simplify expressions):
max
αL
µ ((φH − φL)) ((q − p)2 − c2) + φLαL((q − p)2 − c2) + (1− φL − µ(φH − φL))((q − p)2 + c2)
= max
αL
− µ ((φH − φL)) 2c2 + φLαL((q − p)2 − c2) + (1− φL)((q − p)2 + c2)
(a)
= max
αL
(q − p)2(φLαL + 1− φL)− c2φLαL
(b)
= max
αL
q2
4
(√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL) +
√
φLαL + 1− φL
)2
− c2φLαL
= max
αL
q2
4
(
φLαL + µ(φH − φL) + φLαL + 1− φL + 2
√
(φLαL + µ(φH − φL))(φLαL + 1− φL)
)
− c2φLαL
(a) Remove constant terms and linear terms. Note linear terms do not affect the concavity/convexity
nor the optimal policy. (b) Substituting p¯(µ, α). In proving concavity, the only term with a second
derivative is:
√
(φLαL + µ(φH − φL))(φLαL + 1− φL)
This is clearly concave in µ. The second derivative with respect to αL is:
− φ
2
L(−φHµ+ φL(µ− 1) + 1)2
4(((αL − 1)φL + 1)(αL + µ(φH − φL)))3/2
The numerator is positive as it is a squared term and the denominator is positive because (1−φL) > 0.
Moreover, the determinant of the Hessian equals: Thus, the Hessian is negative semi-definite and the
objective is jointly concave.
Solving for Optimal αL: To determine the optimal policy, we solve for αL.
∂
∂αL
q2
4
(
φLαL + µ(φH − φL) + φLαL + 1− φL + 2
√
(φLαL + µ(φH − φL))(φLαL + 1− φL)
)
− c2φLαL
=− c2φL + q
2
4
(2φL +
φL(1 + φL)(−1 + 2αL − µ) + φHµ√
(1 + (αL − 1)φL)(αLφL + (φH − φL)µ)
)
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Note that if q2 > c2, then αL = 1 as the derivative at αL = 1 is:
−c2 + q
2
2
+
q2
4
(
(1 + φL)(1− µ) + φHµ√
(φL + (φH − φL)µ)
) ≥ −c2 + q
2
2
+
q2
4
(
1 + φL√
φL
) ≥ 0,∀φL
Otherwise, as the objective is concave, we can solve for the optimal αL based on first order conditions.
This is a quadratic where, by inspection, the optimal solution is the larger. Thus, the derivative equals
0 at:
α¯L =
2c4φLY +
√
c2φ2L (c
2 − q2) (q2 − 2c2)2 Y 2 − 2c2φLq2Y
4c2φ2L (c
2 − q2)
=
2c4φLY + cφLY
(
q2 − 2c2)√c2 − q2 − 2c2φLq2Y
4c2φ2L (c
2 − q2)
=
2c4φLY − 2c2φLq2Y
4c2φ2L (c
2 − q2) +
cφLY
(
q2 − 2c2)√c2 − q2
4c2φ2L (c
2 − q2)
=
Y
2φL
+
Y
(
q2 − 2c2)
4cφL
√
c2 − q2
= (1− φL + (φH − φL)µ)
( (
2c2 − q2)
4cφL
√
c2 − q2 −
1
2φL
)
where Y := −φHµ+ φLµ+ φL − 1. and the optimal αL is:
α∗L = min{α+L , 1}.
B.5.2 Vertical Differentiation
The proof follows the same logic as above. If c > q, then the optimal solution is to never promote and
the seller’s price does not matter as no positive price results in any sales. Thus, consider where q > c.
The seller’s best alternative to the platform’s promoted price is setting the price p∗ = min
{
q − c, q2
}
which results in payoff of pi∗ = p∗(q − p∗). The algebra follows very closely to the above.
Case 1: Assume that p∗ = q2 .
(1− φL + φLαL)p(q − p) ≥ pi∗(1− φL − µ(φH − φL))
⇒ p∗(µ, α) = q
2
(
1−
√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)
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Thus,
W ∗(µ, α) =
1
2
(q − p∗(µ))2
=
(
q
2
(
1 +
√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
))2
=
q2
4
(
1 +
√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)2
=
q2
4
+
q2
2
(√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)
+
q2
4
(
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)
This is clearly concave in µ as square root is concave. For αL:
∂2
∂α2L
√
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL = −
φ2L(1 + φL(−1 + µ)− φHµ)(−1 + φL − 4αLφL − 3µ(φH − φL))
4(1− (1− αL)φL)4
(
αLφL+(φH−φL)µ
φL+(−1+αL)φL
) < 0
∂2
∂α2L
(
φLαL + µ(φH − φL)
1− φL + φLαL
)
=
2φ2L (µ (φH − φL) + φL − 1)
((αL − 1)φL + 1)3
< 0
Moreover, the determinant of the Hessian equals:
−q
2φ2L (φH − φL) 2 (µφH + 2αLφLX − 2φLX + 2X + 2αLφL − µφL − φL + 1)
4 ((αL − 1)φL + 1) 4 (µφH + φL (αL − µ)) < 0
where
X :=
√
αLφL + µ(φH − φL)
(αL − 1)φL + 1
By inspection, each term in the fraction is positive. Thus, the fraction is negative and the objective is
jointly concave. The case of p∗ = c follows similarly.
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